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THE PROHIBITION OF COMMENTARIES TO THE DIGEST 
AND THE ANTECESSORIAL LITERATURE* 
 1.
The prohibition of commentaries on the Digest is formulated by Justinian in special 
passages of the introductory constitutions of the Digest (Deo auctore and Tanta/Δέδωκεν), 
which I shall immediately transcribe in full: 
const. Deo auct. § 12: Nostram autem consummationem, quae a vobis deo adnuente 
componetur, Digestorum vel Pandectarum nomen habere sancimus, nullis iuris peritis in 
posterum audentibus commentarios illi applicare et verbositate sua supra dicti codicis 
compendium confundere: quemadmodum et in antiquioribus temporibus factum est, cum 
per contrarias interpretantium sententias totum ius paene conturbatum est: sed sufficiat per 
indices tantummodo et titulorum subtilitatem quae παράτιτλα nuncupantur quaedam 
admonitoria eius facere, nullo ex interpretatione eorum vitio oriundo. 
const. Tanta § 21: Hoc autem quod et ab initio nobis visum est, cum hoc opus fieri deo 
adnuente mandabamus, tempestivum nobis videtur et in praesenti sancire, ut nemo neque 
eorum, qui in praesenti iuris peritiam habent, nec qui postea fuerint audeat commentarios 
isdem legibus adnectere: nisi tantum si velit eas in graecam vocem transformare sub eodem 
ordine eaque consequentia, sub qua voces Romanae positae sunt (hoc quod Graeci κατὰ 
 
 
                                                          
* I believed that this issue could not be absent from a research initiative dealing with the early 
Byzantine legal teaching literature, since it essentially relates to the very presence of this literature. 
Morevover, to this theme the founder of the prestigious Groningen school, Herman Jan Scheltema, 
devoted a specific contribution, which not only, as usual, shed light on the intricate Byzantine textual 
material, but also marked a real turning point in historiography, which, in essence, really can be 
separated into ‘pre-’ and ‘post-Scheltema’. I do not know if the visible fruit of the survey offered in 
this article is commensurate with the honor, that my friends and colleagues Byzantinists and the 
Faculty of Law of the University of Groningen have granted to me with the appointment as Honorary 
Professor at “HJ Scheltema-Chair of Byzantine Law” for the past two years. Let me say though, that 
discussing assiduously with the pages of this Master, filling them with thick παραγραφαί, retracing 
his steps for myself, going from those pages to the sources and vice versa during a tormented 
maturation of ideas, made me feel, proudly, as if I participated in the study community which has 







πόδα dicunt), et si qui forsitan per titulorum subtilitatem adnotare maluerint et ea quae 
παράτιτλα nuncupantur componere. Alias autem legum interpretationes, immo magis 
perversiones eos iactare non concedimus, ne verbositas eorum aliquid legibus nostris adferat 
ex confusione dedecus. Quod et in antiquis edicti perpetui commentatoribus factum est, qui 
opus moderate confectum huc atque illuc in diversas sententias producentes in infinitum 
detraxerunt, ut paene omnem Romanam sanctionem esse confusam. Quos si passi non 
sumus, quemadmodum posteritatis admittatur vana discordia? si quid autem tale facere ausi 
fuerint, ipsi quidem falsitatis rei constituantur, volumina autem eorum omnimodo 
corrumpentur. Si quid vero, ut supra dictum est, ambiguum fuerit visum, hoc ad imperiale 
culmen per iudices referatur et ex auctoritate Augusta manifestetur, cui soli concessum est 
leges et condere et interpretari. 
const. Δέδωκεν § 21: (...) ἀπαγορεύομεν τὸ μηδένα θαρρῆσαι μήτε τῶν νῦν ὄντων μήτε τῶν 
ὕστερον ἐσομένων τούτων δὴ τῶν νόμων ὑπομνήματα γράφειν, πλὴν εἰ μὴ βουληθεῖεν εἰς 
μὲν τὴν Ἑλλήνων γλῶτταν αὐτὰ μεταβαλεῖν, μόνῃ δὲ τῇ κατὰ πόδα καλουμένῃ χρήσασθαι 
τῶν νόμων ἑρμηνείᾳ, καὶ εἴ τι κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὀνομαζομένων παρατίτλων ὡς εἰκὸς 
προσγράψαι βουληθεῖεν χρείαν· ἕτερον δὲ παντάπασιν μηδ᾿ ὁτιοῦν περὶ αὐτὰ πράττειν μηδὲ 
αὖθις δοῦναι στάσεώς τε καὶ ἀμφισβητήσεως καὶ πλήθους τοῖς νόμοις ἀφορμήν· τοῦτο ὅπερ 
καὶ πρόσθεν ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ ἠδίκτου γέγονεν νομοθεσίας, ὥστε καίτοι γε οὕτω βραχύτατον αὐτὸ 
καθεστός, ἐκ τῆς τῶν ποικίλων ὑπομνημάτων διαφορᾶς εἰς ἀναρίθμητον ἐκταθῆναι πλῆθος. 
εἰ γὰρ τι φανείη τυχὸν ἀμφισβητούμενον ἢ τοῖς τῶν δικῶν ἀγωνισταῖς ἢ τοῖς τοῦ κρίνειν 
προκαθημένοις, τοῦτο βασιλεὺς ἑρμηνεύσει καλῶς, ὅπερ αὐτῷ μόνῳ παρὰ τῶν νόμων 
ἐφεῖται. ὡς ὅ γε θαρρῶν παρὰ ταύτην ἡμῶν τὴν νομοθεσίαν ὑπόμνημά τι καταθέσθαι κατὰ 
σχῆμα τῆς ἡμετέρας κελεύσεως ἀλλοιότερον, οὗτος ἴστω τοῖς τῆς παραποιήσεως 
ἐνεξόμενος νόμοις, τοῦ παρ᾿ αὐτοῦ συντεθέντος ἀφαρπαζομένου καὶ πᾶσιν διαφθειρομένου 
τρόποις.  
With these rulings, taken together, Justinian categorically prohibits an activity designated 
as commentarios applicare, commentarios adnectere, ὑπομνήματα γράφειν; and justifies 
this prohibition with the concern that the occurrence of divergent interpretations would 
end up affecting the compendium carried out with the compiling collection. On the other 
hand, the emperor admits two further operations: the literal translations, respectful of the 
position that words have in their original context, and an activity described as admonitoria 
facere and adnotare, to be achieved through tituli and indices (‘called παράτιτλα in 
Greek’). 
Faced with such peremptory provisions, and furthermore accompanied by the 
provision of the very serious penalty of falsum for offenders, the question always 
spontaneously arises of how the existence was possible, immediately following the 
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publication of the Digest, of a written production connected to the teaching activity of the 
antecessores, that is not attributable to the two types of writing tolerated. 
Although the matter has been repeatedly addressed specifically,1 or perhaps because 
of this, I thought it appropriate to devote a special contribution to it, also because of the 
highly pre-conditional role that it assumes with respect to any type of investigation 
relating to Byzantine legal literature.2 
 2.
The starting point of our whole discourse is the fact that the ban was established by 
Justinian only for the Digest, and not also for the Codex or for the Institutes.3 
 
 
                                                          
1  See in particular: A. Berger, ‘The Emperor Justinian’s ban upon the commentaries to the Digest’, 
BIDR 55-56 (1951), 124-169; Id., ‘Zu Justinians Verbot der Digestenkommentierung’, Labeo 4 
(1958), 66-74; F. Pringsheim, ‘Justinian’s Prohibition of Commentaries to the Digest’, RIDA 5 
(1950), 383-415 = Id., Gesammelte Abhandlungen, II, Heidelberg 1961, 86-106); G. Maridakis, 
‘Justinians Verbot der Gesetzeskommentierung’, SZ 73 (1956), 369-375; P. Pescani, ‘Sul divieto di 
Giustiniano a commentari del Digesto’, Labeo 7 (1961), 41-54; H.J. Scheltema, ‘Das 
Kommentarverbot Justinians’, TRG 45 (1977), 307-331 = Id, Opera minora ad iuris historiam 
pertinentia, (collegerunt N. van der Wal, J.H.A. Lokin, B.H. Stolte, Roos Meijering), Groningen 
2004, 403-428); H. Ankum, ‘La ‘codification’ de Justinien était-elle une veritable codification?’, in: 
Liber amicorum John Gilissen, Antwerpen 1983, 1-17 (8-9); Van der Wal/Lokin, Delineatio, 36-37; 
T. Wallinga, TANTA/ΔΕΔΩΚΕΝ. Two Introductory Constitutions to Justinian’s Digest, Groningen 
1989, 107-118; E. Klingenberg, ‘Justinians Verbot der Digestenkommentierung’, in: J. Assmann/B. 
Gladigow, [ed.], Text und Kommentar, München 1995, 407-422; M. Amelotti, ‘Giustiniano interprete 
del diritto’, in: Nozione, formazione e interpretazione del diritto: dall’età romana alle esperienze 
moderne. Ricerche dedicate al professor Filippo Gallo, (4 vols.), Napoli 1997, I, 3-9; M. 
Campolunghi, Potere imperiale e giurisprudenza in Pomponio e Giustiniano, II.1, Perugia 2001, 243-
270; II.2, Perugia 2007, 241-311. 
2  As in G. Falcone, ‘Premessa per uno studio sulla produzione didattica degli antecessores’, in: J.H.A. 
Lokin/B.H. Stolte, [ed.], Introduzione al diritto bizantino. Da Giustiniano ai Basilici, Pavia 2011, 
147-157 (157). 
3  In this sense, e.g., H. Peters, Die oströmischen Digestenkommentare und die Entstehung der 
Digesten, Leipzig 1913, 105; P. Bonfante, Storia del diritto romano, II, Roma 19344, 61; Berger, 
‘The Emperor Justinian’s ban’ (note 1 above), 160-165 (for further preceding literature p. 161 note 
2); more recently, D. Simon, ‘Aus dem Kodexunterricht des Thalelaios. A. Methode’, SZ 86 (1969), 
334-383 (337); Klingenberg, ‘Justinians Verbot’ (note 1 above), 409; R. Meijering, ‘Anatolius and 
the Codex’, in: J.H.A. Lokin/R. Meijering, [ed.], Anatolius and the Excerpta Vaticana et 
Laurentiana. Edition and Commentary, Groningen 1999, 123-267 (267 nt. 45). On the other hand, in 
the sense of an explicit reference also to the Code and the Institutes, cf. Scheltema, ‘Das 
Kommentarverbot’ (note 1 above) 327 = Opera minora, 424-425, followed on this point by Ankum, 
‘La ‘codification’ de Justinien’ (note 1 above), 8 and note 23. Other scholars have held that the ban, 
while explicitly formulated only for the Digest, is to be understood as implicitly thought also for the 
other two collections: thus, for example, B. Kübler, Geschichte des romischen Rechts, Leipzig 1925, 








The exclusive reference to the Digest in const. Deo auct. § 12 and in const. 
Tanta/Δέδωκεν § 21 might appear, at first glance, obvious and inconclusive in relation to 
the range of the prohibition, since the specific object of these constitutions is the Digest. 
However, this assumption becomes important because of the fact that these same 
constitutions had not failed to mention in conjunction the Digest, the Codex, and the 
Institutes, with the drawing up of the ban on using legal texts in the courts not 
incorporated in the three compilations;4 and because of the fact that this joint mentioning 
of the three compilations occurs only a short distance from the prohibition of 
commentaries: in const. Deo auctore, even in the previous §, in const. Tanta/Δέδωκεν, just 
two §§ before. If there had been an imperial will to extend the ban to all collections, the 
author of the constitutions would have had no difficulty devising, also in this case, an 
extended reference. This did not happen, neither at the time of promulgating the three 
constitutions nor with the insertion of the two Latin constitutions in C. 1,17 De veteri iure 
enucleando (...). 
Even more significant, then, is the fact that the prohibition of commentaries is not 
invoked in const. Cordi, which accompanies the publication of the second Code, if one 
considers that, on the other hand, in the same constitution (§ 5) a different prohibition is 
repeated, the prohibition of siglae,5 which had already been established in the constitutions 
Deo auctore (§ 13), Tanta/Δέδωκεν (§ 22) and Omnem (§ 8). 
On the other hand, the only specific argument that has been put forward to argue that 
the ban had been conceived by Justinian also for the Code and the Institutes cannot be 
accepted. In particular, it was argued that the eaedem leges mentioned in const. Tanta § 21 
(...nemo audeat commentarios isdem legibus adnectere...) are the leges mentioned in the 
words of § 19 hasce leges adorate et observate, which would allude to the texts collected 
in the Digest, the Code and the Institutes.6 However, these very words of § 19 refer, in 
fact, only to the texts of the Digest, as is demonstrated by the fact that they are embedded 
between two allusions to the Digest, and specifically between the allusion to the opus 
 
 
                                                          
Riccobono, Lineamenti della storia delle fonti e del diritto romano, Milano 1949, 233 (‘secondo il 
pensiero dell’Imperatore [...] dovevano senza dubbio valere anche per il Codice e le Istituzioni’); L. 
Chiazzese, Introduzione allo studio del diritto romano, Palermo 19583, 421; and, in more recent 
times, F. Gallo, ‘La codificazione giustinianea’, Index 14 (1986), 33-46 (37-38); Campolunghi, 
Potere imperiale (note 1 above), II.1, 244-245 note 103. 
4  As in Berger, ‘The Emperor Justinian’s ban’ (note 1 above), 160. 
5  Const. Cordi § 5: Cuius scriptura ad similitudinem nostrarum institutionum et digestorum sine ulla 
signorum dubietate conscribi iussimus. Cf., again, Berger, ‘The Emperor Justinian’s ban’ (note 1 
above), 160. 
6  As in Scheltema, ‘Das Kommentarverbot’ (note 1 above), 327 = Opera minora, 424-425; and in 
Ankum, ‘La ‘codification’ de Justinien’ (note 1 above), 8 and note 23. 
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saluberrimum and the statement omne quod hicpositum est ...observari censemus.7 Rather, 
the mention of eaedem leges in § 21 can be explained in two different ways, which both 
call into question only the Digest: on the one hand, if we aim at a connection with an 
earlier use of the term leges, we must think – rather than the distant mention of § 19 – of 
the mention of leges in the sense of texts collected in the Digest, which appears 
immediately before, in § 20a;8 on the other hand, the comparison with the corresponding 
passage of const. Δέδωκεν § 21, in which ‘these νόμοι’ is the explanation of ‘this 
νομοθεσία’ (the Digest),9 may suggest an interpretation of the eaedem leges of const. 
Tanta § 21 as an explanation of the words hoc opus from the beginning of the same 
paragraph, alluding once again to the Digest. 
Moreover, a reference to the prohibition only to the Digest coordinates well with the 
very purpose of the prohibition. It is appropriate to focus specifically on this point. 
  3.
The purpose of the prohibition was laid down by Justinian explicitly and unambiguously 
both at the time of the presentation of the compiling project and upon completion of the 
work: the prohibition is intended to prevent the occurrence of divergent interpretations 
which would call into question the outcome of the compendium by increasing indefinitely 
the legal materials. In support of its action the emperor cites the fact that in the past, in his 
opinion, almost the entire legal framework had been ‘disturbed’ and ‘made confused’ 
because of the proliferation of conflicting stances: this situation occurred in particular 
 
 
                                                          
7  Const. Tanta § 19: Haec igitur omnia scientes, patres conscripti et omnes orbis terrarum homines, 
gratias quidem amplissimas agite summae divinitati, quae vestris temporibus tam saluberrimum opus 
servavit: quo enim antiquitas digna divino non est visa iudicio, hoc vestris temporibus indultum est. 
Hasce itaque leges et adorate et observate omnibus antiquioribus quiescentibus: nemoque vestrum 
audeat vel comparare eas prioribus vel, si quid dissonans in utroque est, requirere, quia omne quod 
hic positum est hoc unicum et solum observari censemus (...). 
8  Const. Tanta § 20: Ne autem incognitum vobis fiat, ex quibus veterum libris haec consummatio 
ordinata est, iussimus et hoc in primordiis digestorum nostrorum inscribi, ut manifestissimum sit, ex 
quibus legislatoribus quibusque libris eorum et quot milibus hoc iustitiae Romanae templum 
aedificatum est. § 20a.: Legislatores autem vel commentatores eos elegimus, qui digni tanto opere 
fuerant et quos et anteriores piissimi principes admittere non sunt indignati, omnibus uno dignitatis 
apice impertito nec sibi quodam aliquam praerogativam vindicante. Cum enim constitutionum vicem 
et has leges obtinere censuimus quasi ex nobis promulgatas, quid amplius aut minus in quibusdam 
esse intellegatur, cum una dignitas, una potestas omnibus est indulta?. In this sense, Wallinga, 
TANTA/ΔΕΔΩΚΕΝ (note 1 above), 113. 
9  In fact, the repetition of the same demonstrative adjective (…τὴν νομοθεσίαν ἀθροισθῆναι ταύτην 
ἐγκελευόμενοι (...); (…) τούτων δὴ τῶν νόμων ὑπομνήματα…) shows that the νόμοι to which the 
prohibition refers are the same that put together the νομοθεσία-Digest. On the use of νομοθεσία to 







during and because of the interpretative work carried out by the jurists on the praetorian 
edict.10 The ban, therefore, reflects Justinian’s concern to not re-expose the leges to a vana 
discordia, and it is significant that this motivation is engraved at the centre of the overall 
arrangement, immediately before determining the penalty for offenders, with an incisive 
rhetorical question: Quos si passi non sumus, quemadmodum posteritatis admittatur vana 
discordia? 
In addition to the objective evidence of the overall content is illuminating the 
specific vocabulary, which finds correspondence in certain terminological and conceptual 
choices adopted by Justinian in other legislative interventions. 
Thus, the negative meaning of verbositas in relation to disputes of interpretation is 
encountered in the sequence of C. 6,38,4: tanta auctorum varietas – omni huiusmodi 
verbositate explosa; and it conforms to the use of prolixitas in C. 7,47,1: huiusmodi 
prolixitatem (...) in angustum coartare, and in const. Cordi § 1: omne ius antiquum 
supervacua prolixitate liberum... (thanks to the constitutions with which Justinian has cut 
off the altercationes of the jurists). 
Similarly, the use of compendium and of the adverb moderate (opus moderate 
confectum) with reference to the limited size (of the Digest and the edict respectively) in 
comparison with the interpretations’ indefinite dilation, corresponds with the fact that the 
imperial interventions which eliminated the accumulation of interpretative disputes are 
often represented in terms of concise and incisive brevity; see for instance C. 3,33,13: 
auctorum iurgium decidentes, compendioso responso omnem dubitationem resecamus; C. 
3,33,14: antiquitas dubitabat (...) tales altercationes decidentes (...) paucissimis verbis 
totam eorum ambiguitatem delevimus; C. 5,4,24: sic etenim et antiqui iuris contentio 
dirimetur et immensa librorum volumina ad mediocrem modum tandem pervenient; C. 
6,38,4,1: et si quis eorum altercationes singillatim exponere maluerit, nihil prohibet non 
leve libri volumen extendere; C. 6,58,13: huiusmodi dubitationem compendioso responso 
duximus esse finiendam; C. 7,40,1: tantae moles altercationum, compendiosis 
sanctionibus; and finally C. 7,47,1: huiusmodi prolixitatem (...) in angustum coartare. 
 
 
                                                          
10  Despite the fact that very authoritative scholars have thought that the commentatores of const. Tanta 
§ 21 (as already the interpretantes of const. Deo auct. § 12) were post-classical scholars (F. 
Wieacker, ‘Lateinische Kommentare zum Kodex Theodosianus’, in: Symb. Freiburg. in honorem O. 
Lenel, Leipzig 1931, 259-356 (313); A. Guarino, ‘La compilazione dei Digesta Iustiniani’, in: Studi 
in onore di Gaetano Scherillo, II, Milano 1972, 717-748 (741) = Pagine di diritto romano, IV, Napoli 
1994, 446), I believe that the specific reference to the edict – quod et in antiquis edicti perpetui 
commentatoribus factum est – can only be understood as referring to the work of the classical jurists; 
cf., moreover, the correspondence with the use of commentatores in the opening of const. Tanta § 20, 
explicitly referring to the classical jurists. 
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Again, for the reference to the confusio created by the occurrence of conflicting opinions 
see the sequence of C. 7,40,3: (...) apud veteres agitabatur (...) – Sed et in iudiciis in multis 
casibus tales altercationes ventilatas invenimus, (...) – Sancimus itaque nullam in iudiciis 
in posterum locum habere talem confusionem(...),11 as well as the passage of const. 
Imperatoriam § 2, in which Justinian recalls that, thanks to the work of the (first) Code, 
the multiple constitutions previously confusae had been brought by him to consonantia. 
Finally, for the concept of ‘infinity’ as opposed to a defined size (opus moderate 
confectum (...) in infinitum detraxerunt) see, still regarding the multiplicity of conflicting 
interpretations, C. 7,47,1: dubitationes antiquae in infinitum productae sunt – huiusmodi 
prolixitatem (...) in angustum coartare – finis antiquae prolixitatis. 
From another point of view, the incipit of const. Deo auctore provides a further, 
indirect, but very significant clue: 
const. Deo auct. § 12: Nostram autem consummationem, quae a vobis deo adnuente 
componetur, Digestorum vel Pandectarum nomen habere sancimus, nullis iuris peritis in 
posterum audentibus commentarios illi applicare (....). 
I refer to the fact that the ban is immediately and resolutely linked to the naming of the 
collection.12 The author of this text did not reveal the meaning of the particular naming 
(and this makes the clue indirect). But this is explained by const. Tanta § 1: 
Nomenque libris imposuimus Digestorum seu Pandectarum, quia omnes disputationes et 
decisiones in se habent legitimas et quod undique fuit collectum, hoc in sinus suos 
receperunt, (...). 
The name is explained with reference to two circumstances: a) the work contains within it 
all possible disputationes and decisiones legitimae, i.e. all interpretative discussions and 
determinations which end them, and b) the work contains material that has been collected 
 
 
                                                          
11  It is worth quoting – even if, naturally, what is directly conclusive is the Justinian material – the 
following incipit of the emperor Leo’s constitution in C. 6,60,4, which embodies some of the 
conceptualizations considered here: Omnem ambiguitatis confusionem amputantes hac liquida et 
compendiosa lege sancimus (…). 
12  Also in the other case in which, in one of the introductory constitutions, Justinian introduces a ban 
with the formula nemine audente, it constitutes an immediate consequence of what is said 
immediately before; const. Tanta § 10: Et ex multis similibus vel contrariis quod rectius habere 
apparebat, hoc pro aliis omnibus positum est unaque omnibus auctoritate indulta, ut quidquid ibi 
scriptum est, hoc nostrum appareat et ex nostra voluntate compositum: nemine audente comparare 
ea quae antiquitas habebat his quae nostra auctoritas introduxit, quia multa et maxima sunt, quae 







to ‘put safe’ (in sinos suos receperunt), remedying the previous situation, described in the 
same § 1, in which ipsa vetustatis opera seemed dissoluta and omnia (i.e. all classical 
writings filtered) were effusa in more than three hundred thousand verses. If we admit that 
even the author of the const. Deo auctore had in mind these concepts underlying the titles 
of the collection, the aforementioned close connection between the name of the collection 
and the prohibition is itself a further expression of Justinian’s concern to avoid re-
exposing the leges to initiatives that would bring the germ of the ius controversum and 
indefinitely increase the amount of legal material. 
Now, the overcoming of the numerous lawyers’ altercationes, made with the L 
decisiones and with the aliae constitutiones ad commodum operis pertinentes, was the 
main pride of Justinian in relation to the putting together of the Digest. It is clearly 
evidenced, on the one hand, by repeated references in the introductory constitutions 
(const. Tanta § 10: (...) et si quid inter eos dubitabatur, hoc iam in tutissimam pervenit 
quietem, nullo titubante relicto; const. Tanta § 11: (...) Admonuimus autem eos, ut 
memores etiam nostrarum fiant constitutionum, quas pro emendatione iuris 
promulgavimus, (...) ut sit manifestum et quid antea vacillabat et quid postea in 
stabilitatem redactum est; const. Cordi § 1: (...) tam quinquaginta decisiones quam alias 
ad commodum propositi operis pertinentes plurimas constitutiones promulgavimus, 
quibus (...) omne(que) ius antiquum supervacua prolixitate13 liberum et enucleatum in 
nostris institutionibus et digestis reddidimus); on the other hand, by the fact that the 
emperor emphatically considers the achievement of moderatio and of legitima veritas the 
most significant merit of the compiling work on the classical texts: 
const. Tanta § 12: (...) Omnibus itaque hominibus eandem sanctionem manifestam facere 
necessarium esse perspeximus, ut sit eis cognitum, quanta confusione et infinitate absoluti in 
quantam moderationem et legitimam veritatem pervenerunt: legesque in posterum habeant 
tam directas quam compendiosas (...).14 
 
 
                                                          
13  We recall the reference to the supervacua prolixitas and to the verbositas in relation to the ancient 
jurisprudential disputes: supra, in the text. 
14  The text, which describes the result of the compiling work, must be read taking into account the 
whole § 10, which illustrated the execution of the same work from within: Tanta autem nobis 
antiquitati habita est reverentia, ut nomina prudentium taciturnitati tradere nullo patiamur modo: 
sed unusquisque eorum, qui auctor legis fuit, nostris digestis inscriptus est: hoc tantummodo a nobis 
effecto, ut, si quid in legibus eorum vel supervacuum vel imperfectum aut minus idoneum visum est, 
vel adiectionem vel deminutionem necessariam accipiat et rectissimis tradatur regulis. Et ex multis 
similibus vel contrariis quod rectius habere apparebat, hoc pro aliis omnibus positum est unaque 
omnibus auctoritate indulta, ut quidquid ibi scriptum est, hoc nostrum appareat et ex nostra 
voluntate compositum: nemine audente comparare ea quae antiquitas habebat his quae nostra 
auctoritas introduxit, quia multa et maxima sunt, quae propter utilitatem rerum transformata sunt. 
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The two terms, moderatio and veritas, that express the compilatory result allude to the 
elimination of infinitas and of confusio, and these negative connotations of the past 
consist, respectively, in the accumulation of vast and dispersed legal material and in the 
lack of clarity and precision because of the presence of conflicting data which involve 
dubitationes and altercationes.15 This means that in the formulations of the ban, words 
such as compendium confundere, opus moderate confectum in infinitum detrahere, 
Romanam sanctionem confundere, allude precisely to the situations of the past, the 
overcoming of which Justinian presents as the most significant merit of the Digest’s 
compiling initiative and the main improvement over the old state of things. Consequently, 
the justification of the ban through the reference to the negative example of the past, 
consisting in the occurrence of contrariae sententiae of the edicti commentatores (as of 
the interpretantes in const. Deo auct. § 12), takes on a particularly pregnant meaning. 
The preceding justifies, as mentioned, the fact that the ban was designed by 
Justinian exclusively for the Digest. 
The commentarii/ὑπομνήματα, clearly depicted as on the same level of interventions 
by the commentatores that made the edict and even the entire ius ‘confused’ in the given 
sense, would have been a catalyst of a potential new proliferation of conflicting 
interpretations, and this new proliferation would have ruined the success of the elimination 
of lawyers’ altercationes that had been accomplished precisely for the emendatio of the 
vetus ius and the realization of the consummatio-Digest, and that was Justinian’s great 
pride.16 On the other hand, the periculum of a rebirth of ius controversum through the 
commentari/ὑπομνήματα had to be warned about (and with it, the need for the ban) only 
for the Digest, and not for the Code or the Institutes, also on account of the material from 
which the three collections were put together. The material in the Digest was already 
drenched in controversy. It is often articulated through a problematizing and ‘open’ 
approach, comparisons between rationes and debates between auctores that had resulted 
 
 
                                                          
Adeo ut et si principalis constitutio fuerat in veteribus libris relata, neque ei pepercimus, sed et hanc 
corrigendam esse putavimus et in melius restaurandam. Nominibus etenim veteribus relictis, 
quidquid legum veritati decorum et necessarium fuerat, hoc nostris emendationibus servavimus. Et 
propter hanc causam et si quid inter eos dubitabatur, hoc iam in tutissimam pervenit quietem, nullo 
titubante relicto. 
15  On this point, I refer to my article ‘La veritas delle leges: C.7.62.39.2a; cost. Tanta §§ 10 e 12’, in: C. 
Cascione/C. Masi, [ed.], Quid est veritas?, Napoli 2013, 451-458 (455-457). 
16  H.J. Scheltema, ‘Les Quinquaginta decisiones’, SG I (1984), 1-9 (9) = Opera minora, 158-162 (162), 
acutely observed that the fact that some of the L decisiones were inserted into the Code, even though 
the Digest already received their innovative content, did not respond to a legal need: ‘Les décisions 
reprises au Code devaient conserver le souvenir de la grande réforme judiciaire; elles devaient 
montrer à la postérité l’image d’un Justinien arbitrant les différences des célèbres jurisconsultes du 







in a verius est or a verius videtur: it was by its very nature material that lent itself (or could 
be seen as suitable for) to soliciting personal stances from the interpreters and, therefore, 
to fuelling further ius controversum.17 Otherwise, the texts collected in the Code – despite 
being subject to clarifications, possibly as a result of personal opinion, relating to the 
findings of particular elements of the case – contain clear-cut imperial determinations, not 
themselves set upon a controversial or problematic point of view.18 As for the Institutes, 
the fact in itself that it was an exposition of prima legum cunabula is irrelevant,19 since an 
introductory didactic work could also be made through frequent references to conflicting 
positions, as shown by the Institutes of Gaius, hitherto used for teaching. Rather, the fact 
is relevant that precisely Gaius’ topos of references to opposing opinions and solutions 
(which might have appear as opportunities for the formation of contrariae sententiae 
interpretantium), was overtaken in the imperial manual through a plain and unproblematic 
representation of the institutions. 
In conclusion, that the creative-interpretative monopoly of the emperor – reiterated 
also in const. Tanta/Δέδωκεν § 21, as we shall see in a moment – is of general application 
is undeniable.20 But what we have to consider is the range of a prohibition whose specific 
object is a particular sort of writing, the commentarii/ὑπομνήματα: and such a prohibition 
is formulated with exclusive reference to the Digest. Thus the question at the centre of this 
investigation, i.e. the existence of a literary production by the antecessores despite the 
prohibition, must be defined, in accordance with the formal aspect of the Justinian 
wording, in respect of the production on the Digest.21 
 
 
                                                          
17  Similarly, J.E. Spruit, Enchiridium. Overzicht van de geschiedenis van het Romeins privaatrecht, 
Deventer 1975, 248. 
18  I consider Berger’s reference (‘The Emperor Justinian’s ban’ (note 1 above), 163-164) to the fact that 
‘even in classical times, imperial constitutions were not an object of controversial literature’ 
unproductive. Similarly, it seems to me that the other considerations of this scholar do not affect the 
substance, which, I think, is the overall nature of the material collected therein. 
19  Contrary to what Berger, ‘The Emperor Justinian’s ban’ (note 1 above), 162-163, believed. For his 
part, F. Wieacker, Römische Rechtsgeschichte, II, München 2006, 300 thinks that with respect to the 
Code and the Institutes perhaps it was regarded as obvious that ‘vor Gericht nur authentisches 
Kaiserrecht zitiert werden konnte’: this reading is connected to the idea (ibidem) that the prohibition 
was intended to prevent litigants from adding (adnectere), in court, to the citation of the Digest also 
the commentaries (infra, note 81). 
20  Gallo, ‘La compilazione giustinianea’ (note 3 above), 37-38; Campolunghi, Potere imperiale (note 1 
above), II.1, 245 note 103 in fine. 
21  On the basis of the surviving material one thinks – besides, of course, that of Stephanus, the best 
preserved commentary in the sources (on which, above all, H.J. Scheltema, L’enseignement du droit 
des antecesseurs, Leiden 1970, 24-29 = Opera minora, 75-79; H. de Jong, Stephanus en zijn 
Digestenonderwijs, Amsterdam 2008) – of the commentary of Theophilus (for which see, in 
particular, K.E. Zachariä von Lingenthal, Kritische Jahrbücher f. Deutsche Rechtswiss., VIII (1844), 
794-828 (817); Heimbach, Prolegomena, 33-36; Peters, Die oströmischen Digesten-kommentare 
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The comparison with the work of the commentators on the praetorian edict within the 
context of the ban on commentaries deserves, for its centrality, to be further clarified 
through a closer consideration of the relationship between commentarii/ὑπομνήματα and 
interpretare/ἑρμηνεύειν in the wording of the introductory constitutions. 
We have to start from the statement of const. Tanta (§ 21), where the subject, after 
the mention of actions tolerated, turns back to focus on prohibited commentarii: Alias 
autem legum interpretationes, immo magis perversiones eos iactare non concedimus (...). 
Evidently, the qualification aliae interpretationes shows that not only the commentarii 
themselves, but also the types of writing considered immediately before, were to be taken 
as forms of interpretationes.22 The point to recognize is, therefore, the common 
characteristic element. 
 It should first be noted, with reference to one of the tolerated types, that what in 
const. Tanta is per titulorum subtilitatem adnotare was indicated in the const. Deo auct. (§ 
12) as per indices tantummodo et titulorum subtilitatem admonitoria facere. This is 
noteworthy since the literary tradition of late Antiquity provides some sources that testify 
to a common use of indices and tituli as equivalent terms to designate short remarks 
formulated for the purpose of admonere readers about the contents of a wider text, 
allowing them to better orient themselves:23 
Cassiod., Inst. I,1,10: Sed ut textus memorati Octateuchi quodam nobis compendio 
panderetur, in principiis librorum de universa serie lectionis titulos eis credidimus 
imprimendos, a maioribus nostris ordine currente descriptos, ut lector utiliter ammonitus 
 
 
                                                          
(note 3 above), passim; Scheltema, L’enseignement, 30-31 = Opera minora, 80), of the commentary 
of Cobidas (for its derivation from the teaching, cf. Falcone, ‘Premessa’ (note 2 above), 152), of the 
commentary, a trace of which is contained in PSI 55, deriving from a difficult-to-identify author (cf. 
G. Falcone, ‘‘Ἀνώνυμον συνάλλαγμα’ e anonimo antecessor in PSI. 55’, Minima Epigraphica et 
Papyrologia, IV.6 (2001), 513-529, recently followed by De Jong, Stephanus, 52-63, esp. 61-63). 
But, since each teacher held courses on the whole program established by const. Omnem, we must 
conclude that texts derived also from the didactical activity of other antecessores may have 
circulated. A concrete textual trace with respect to Thalelaeus (BS 2127/29) is discussed in F. 
Brandsma, Dorotheus and his Digest translation, Groningen 1996, 32-39. 
22  The remark, of course, is not new: cf., e.g., Wieacker, ‘Lateinische Kommentare’ (note 10 above), 
318-321 and Berger, ‘The emperor Justinian’s ban’ (note 1 above), 146, who drew from it an 
argument to support, quite unfoundedly, that the ἑρμηνεία κατὰ πόδα consisted not in a literal 
translation, but in an interpretation to be made following step by step the text to be commented on: cf. 
infra the text. 







salubriter reddatur attentus, et facile unamquamque rem dum quaerit inveniat, quam sibi 
cognoscit breviter indicatam. 
Cassiod., Inst. I,6,5: Quorum tamen librorum titulos sub brevitate collegi, quando 
instructionis non minimum creditur esse compendium, res fusas latissime paucis sermonibus 
indicare; his enim remediis lectoris animus introductus saluberrimam Scripturarum seriem 
provocatus excurrit. 
Aug., Enarr. in Psalmos, 92,1: (...) psalmi huius titulum, cum pronuntiaretur, audiuimus; et 
quid sibi uelit, de scriptura dei, hoc est ex libro genesis, non est difficile cognoscere; in 
titulo enim tamquam admonemur in limine quid intus quaeramus. 
Hier., in Ezech. 4, praef.: Vellem, si fieri posset, (...) explanationes in Hiezechiel per 
singulos libros propriis texere prophetiis (...); longumque et immensum interpretationis iter 
certis spatiis separarem, ut quasi titulis et indicibus et, ut proprius loquar, argumentis 
ostenderem quid libri singuli continerent. 
In accordance with these attestations,24 the type of operation designated as admonitoria 
facere through tituli and indices can be described as an aid to the consultation of the texts, 
by summarizing briefly the content of an extensive passage to ‘warn’ and prepare the 
reader, who consequently can find his way through the various subjects and issues dealt 
with in the work. The synthetic indications, in the configuration held by the writer of the 
const. Deo auctore, were to be placed on the margins of the manuscript, that is, next to the 
Latin text: παράτιτλα;25 from the same perspective const. Tanta speaks of adnotare and of 
 
 
                                                          
24  As Scheltema opportunely stressed (L’enseignement (note 21 above), 64 (= Opera minora, 69) note 
44 in fine), the phrase quasi per indicem tangere of Gaius 3,54 and then of (Iust.) Inst. 4,18,12 is not 
instead conclusive (but see still, recently, Campolunghi, Potere imperiale (note 1 above), II.2, 261-
262). 
25  For the meaning of παράτιτλα as ‘Randscholien’, ‘Randbemerkungen’ cf., above all, Scheltema, ‘Das 
Kommentarverbot’ (note 1 above) 319-323 = Opera minora, 416-420 and, most recently, W. Kaiser, 
Die Epitome Iuliani. Beiträge zum römischen Recht im frühen Mittelalter und zum byzantinischen 
Rechtsunterricht, Frankfurt/M. 2004, 248-249. The latter scholar, moreover, appropriately 
emphasizes the operations per titulorum subtilitatem admonitoria facere, per titulorum subtilitatem 
adnotare and παράτιτλα componere are equivalent. For my part, I would add that the literary 
attestations from late Antiquity quoted in the text lead us to conclude that also the indices were 
mentioned in const. Deo auctore (perhaps with some redundancy) with an equivalent connotation and 
function (as already stated by Heimbach, Prolegomena, 3); and that, probably, this term is not 
repeated in const. Tanta because of the knowledge that index and ἴνδιξ were used, even in legal 
environments, to indicate writings of considerable scale, as indeed was seen also in the Late Latin 
lexicon: cf. Amm. Marc. 29,1,41: Deinde congesti innumeri codices, et acervi voluminorum multi, 
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παράτιτλα componere, const. Δέδωκεν speaks of προσγράφειν. And these indications 
should be characterized by conciseness and reduced extension (per titulorum 
subtilitatem).26 Even in this latter respect there are significant correspondences in literary 
sources from the late period, in which adnotationes placed in the margins of the writing (e 
latere adnotare)27 were consistently indicated in terms of ‘brevity’;28 a text of Cassiodorus 
also refers to adnotationes placed in margine speaking of subtilissimae et brevissimae 
dictiones, a reference to the content (and not to the amount of writing),29 strongly 
reminiscent of the Justinian words per titulorum subtilitatem. The emperor had to tolerate 
the traditional use of these annotations (if not, indeed, to encourage their use),30 for two 
reasons: on the one hand, he was aware of the fact that they, summarily showing the 
contents of the texts, were useful in orienting the reader of an articulated complex of leges 
that, even within unitary titles, embraced various issues and disparate cases; on the other 
hand, he believed that, because of the simplicity and dry brevity of the contents, this 
operation did not involve the risk of overlapping personal opinions on the meaning of the 
leges (const. Deo auct. § 12: sed sufficiat per indices tantummodo et titulorum subtilitatem 
quae παράτιτλα nuncupantur quaedam admonitoria eius facere, nullo ex interpretatione 
eorum vitio oriundo).31 
 
 
                                                          
sub conspectu iudicum concremati sunt, ex domibus eruti variis ut illeciti, ad leniendam caesorum 
invidiam, cum essent plerique liberalium disciplinarum indices variarum et iuris. 
26  Pescani, ‘Sul divieto giustinianeo’ (note 1 above), 44 speaks of a ‘compendiosa stringatezza dei 
titoli’. The reading of Scheltema (‘Das Kommentarverbot’ (note 1 above), 323-324 = Opera minora, 
421) of per titulorum subtilitatem as alluding to indices written in small letters does not appear 
convincing. The context shows that this indication is opposed to the verbositas of the commentarii: 
cf. Meijering, ‘Anatolius and the Codex’ (note 3 above), 266 note 44. Moreover, as Kaiser, Die 
Epitome Iuliani (note 25 above), 249 objects: ‘es liegt in der Natur von erläuternden 
Randbemerkungen, daß sie in kleinerer Schrift als der Text erschienen’. The consolidated and 
expected use of small handwriting in margine was evidently imposed by requirements of space and 
necessity of distinction from the commented text. 
27  Cf., e.g., Hier., Epist. CVI, 46; and, particularly important, LVII,2,2:  (...) ex latere in pagina breviter 
adnotans quem intrinsecus sensum singula capita continerent (...). 
28  Cf. Cassiod., Inst. I,3,1; I,4,2; I,8,8; I,8,11; but the list could go on. 
29  Cassiod., Inst. 1,8,1: (…) annotationes conscriptas in ipso initio meae lectionis inveni, (…) sed nobis 
ex praecedentibus lectionibus diligenti retractatione patuerunt suptilissimas quidem esse ac 
brevissimas dictiones, sed Pelagiani erroris venena illic esse seminata (…). 
30  As the author of the Quaestiones de iuris subtilitatibus (q. 38A) believed: Idem princeps permittit 
inmo adhortatur per titulorum subtilitatem amonitoria quedam facere. 
31  For our purposes it is immaterial whether in the phrase nullo ex interpretatione eorum vitio oriundo 
the pronoun eorum refers to the iuris periti mentioned at the start of the paragraph, thus interpretatio 
having to mean the activity, or whether it refers to the term admonitoria, implying an allusion to the 
result expressed by the same admonitoria. For this alternative see, above all, Scheltema, ‘Das 
Kommentarverbot’ (note 1 above), 329 = Opera minora, 427; Campolunghi, Potere imperiale (note 1 







As for the other exception to the ban, Berger observed at his time that the activity for 
which the const. Δέδωκεν speaks of ἑρμηνεία κατὰ πόδα could not consist of a translation, 
as is generally believed, from the moment the verb ἑρμηνεύειν is used later, in the same § 
21, with regard to an emperor’s interpretative intervention that does certainly not consist 
of a translation: instead, it is a case of ‘authentic’ interpretation of doubtful cases. Hence 
Berger’s conclusion that the ἑρμηνεία in question is referring to an actual interpretatio as 
that which had been carried out by jurists in the classical age, and that the phrase ἑρμηνεία 
κατὰ πόδα would mean ‘interpretation which explains the original text word for word’.32 
Soon after its appearance, the overall reading proposed by Berger was the subject of 
acute and definitive objections by N. van der Wal,33 to which I can certainly refer. On the 
other hand, as is well known, subsequent research by Holwerda and Scheltema stated that 
the κατὰ πόδας was a word for word translation, placed in an interlinear position in the 
manuscript of the ῥητόν, and had, in essence, the role of simple lexical support,34 intended 
to clarify the meaning of the words of the official text. Here we must specifically highlight 
that the comparison with the intervention of the emperor, recalled by Berger, not only does 
not prevent us from considering the ἑρμηνεία κατὰ πόδα as a literal translation, but also, 
far more interesting here, helps to reveal the element which, as previously stated, is 
common to all the activities provided for by const. Tanta/Δέδωκεν. Thus we read: 
const. Δέδωκεν § 21: (...) εἰ γὰρ τι φανείη τυχὸν ἀμφισβητούμενον ἢ τοῖς τῶν δικῶν 
ἀγωνισταῖς ἢ τοῖς τοῦ κρίνειν προκαθημένοις, τοῦτο βασιλεὺς ἑρμηνεύσει καλῶς, ὅπερ 
αὐτῷ μόνῳ παρὰ τῶν νόμων ἐφεῖται (...). 
const. Tanta § 21: (...) Si quid vero, ut supra dictum est, ambiguum fuerit visum, hoc ad 
imperiale culmen per iudices referatur et ex auctoritate Augusta manifestetur, cui soli 
concessum est leges et condere et interpretari. 
While in the Greek text there are no direct indications other than the use itself of 
ἑρμηνεύειν, in the corresponding passage of the const. Tanta the interpretare is explained 
 
 
                                                          
32  Berger, ‘The emperor Justinian’s ban’ (note 1 above), 143. 
33  N. van der Wal, Les commentaires grecs du code de Justinien, ’s-Gravenhage 1953, 50-51. 
34  D. Holwerda, ‘Le Code de Justinien et sa traduction grecque’, Classica et Mediaevalia 23 (1962), 
274-292 (= J.H.A. Lokin/S.L. Radt/B.H. Stolte, [ed.], Exempla Philologica. Vier Aufsätze von D. 
Holwerda, Groningen 2000, 1-15); H.J. Scheltema, ‘Subseciva IX. Das Κατὰ πόδαs’, TRG 31 (1963), 
99-100 (= Opera minora, 130-131); Id., L’enseignement (note 21 above), 33-35 (= Opera minora, 82-
83). More recently, Van der Wal/Lokin, Delineatio, 43; J.H.A. Lokin/Th.E. Bochove, ‘Compilazione 
– educazione – purificazione. Dalla legislazione di Giustiniano ai Basilica cum scholiis’, in: 
Lokin/Stolte, Introduzione al diritto bizantino (note 2 above), 99-146 (131-132). Brandsma, 
Dorotheus (note 21 above), 278 speaks of a ‘wordlist’. 
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in terms of ‘making manifest’ the dubious legal issue. Not only that, but the mention of 
the imperial exclusivity for condere et interpretare leges evidently refers to the famous 
529 AD constitution stored in C. 1,14,12,4, in which the imperial interpretatio is expressly 
assumed as an activity that opens up, i.e. clears up and makes manifest the aenigmata 
which can be found in the legal texts.35 Well, according to this use of ἑρμηνεύειν as 
‘making manifest’,36 it is not surprising that also the μεταβαλεῖν the texts of the Digest,37 
 
 
                                                          
35  C. 1,14,12,4: (...) quare ambiguitates iudicum, quas ex legibus oriri evenit, aures accipiunt nostrae, 
si non a nobis interpretatio mera procedit? vel quis legum aenigmata solvere et omnibus aperire 
idoneus esse videbitur nisi is, cui soli legis latorem esse concessum est? 5. (...) tam conditor quam 
interpres legum solus imperator iuste existimabitur. On the relationship between the statement of 
const. Tanta/Δέδωκεν § 21 and the constitution of 529 AD cf., lately, Campolunghi, Potere imperiale 
(note 1 above), II.1, in particular 271-306 and R. Martini, ‘Sul monopolio interpretativo di 
Giustiniano’, SDHI LXXVI (2010), 425-431 (428-431). See also the constitution of Valentinian and 
Marcian of 454 AD significantly inserted into the Justinian Code, just before Justinian’s constitution 
of 529 AD: Leges sacratissimae, quae constringunt omnium vitas, intellegi ab omnibus debent, ut 
universi praescripto earum manifestius cognito vel inhibita declinent vel permissa sectentur. si quid 
vero in isdem legibus latum fortassis obscurius fuerit, oportet id imperatoria interpretatione patefieri 
(...) (C. 1,14,9). 
36  For this meaning the texts of antecessores are particularly significant in which it is stated that there is 
no need to make any ἑρμηνεία as the wording of the text is already clear or, conversely, that it is 
appropriate ἑρμηνεύειν information that appears unclear. Cf. BS 406/6: Σαφεστάτη ἐστὶν ἡ διάταξις 
καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἑρμηνείας δεομένη; BS 1073/30: φανερὸν τὸ νόμιμον ὅλον τῆς διατάξεως καὶ 
ἑρμηνείας μὴ δεόμενον; for the case of a lack of clarity, cf. Theoph. 4,3 pr.: ἑρμηνεύσομεν δὲ τὰ 
εἰρημένα τῷ νόμῳ, ἀσαφῆ κατά τι δοκοῦντα. 
37  The idea, supported in particular by Berger, ‘The emperor Justinian’s ban’ (note 1 above), 137-138 
and by Pescani, ‘Sul divieto di Giustiniano’ (note 1 above), 44-51 and taken up again very recently 
by Campolunghi, Potere imperiale (note 1 above), II.2, 247 note 106, according to which in the 
Greek provision the expression αὐτὰ μεταβαλεῖν would refer to ὑπομνήματα, because of the neutral 
plural, is certainly to be rejected. Not only does a ban on ‘writing ὑπομνήματα’ not logically 
coordinate with the prevision of the possibility of ‘translating the same’, but a reference to the 
ὑπομνήματα is belied by a comparison between the sentence in which the neutral pronoun appears 
again (ἕτερον δὲ παντάπασιν μηδ᾿ ὁτιοῦν περὶ αὐτὰ πράττειν (...)) and the corresponding affirmation 
of const. Tanta (§ 21): alias autem legum interpretationes (...) iactare non concedimus. In fact, the 
neutral αὐτά, as a result of the above indicated comparison with the Latin text, alludes to the νόμοι 
that were mentioned just before; and this circumstance is explained – as observed by Klingenberg, 
‘Justinians Verbot’ (note 1 above), 414, referring to the authority of R. Kühner/B. Gerth, 
Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache, II.1, 1898 (repr. Hannover 1983), 61, wherein, 
furthermore, is also cited the example of Pl., R. 300 d 5, where the νόμοι are referred to with the 
neutral παρὰ αὐτά – in the light of a characteristic Greek grammatical usage, in which a masculine or 
feminine noun is referred to with a plural neuter of a demonstrative ‘wenn gleichsam der ganze 
Bereich eines Begriffes bezeichnet werden soll’. That this is so is confirmed by the unnoticed fact, 
that the same phenomenon is found also in const. Δέδωκεν § 19, in which the repeated use of the 
neuter plural is preceded, also in this case, by a reference to the νόμοι: (...) χρῆσθε δὲ τοῖς ἡμετέροις 
νόμοις, τῶν τοῖς πάλαι βιβλίοις ἐγγεγραμμένων προσέχοντες οὐδενί, οὐδὲ ἀντεξετάζοντες αὐτὰ πρὸς 
τὰ νῦν κείμενα(...). Καὶ γὰρ ἀπαγορεύομεν ἐκείνοις τὸ λοιπὸν χρῆσθαι, ταῦτα δὲ δὴ καὶ 








namely translating the Greek texts, is represented, in the same context, as ἑρμηνεία, that 
is, as a form of revelation or clarification of the meaning of a text. The same is true with 
respect to indices – tituli – παράτιτλα. These, too, coordinating the predicted use of 
interpretare = manifestare in the closing of const. Tanta § 21 with the mention of aliae 
interpretationes, should be understood as examples of ‘clarifications’. In fact, the function 
we have recognized through literary sources, of brief summaries of the contents of the 
leges can certainly be traced back to the idea of making the leges open, shedding light on 
the leges of the Digest. It is precisely because of this common reference to the idea of 
‘clarification’ that the author of const. Deo auct. § 12 was able to use, in a same context, 
both interpretare in the sense of an explanare which involves autonomy of position 
(...interpretantium contrarias sententias...) and interpretatio in relation to a mere essential 
indication of the contents of a text (...nullo ex interpretatione eorum vitio oriundo...). 
That being the case, then even the commentaries covered by the prohibition should 
be understood as an expression of interpretationes in the sense of ‘clarifications’. Now, 
this may be explained by the reference made to the work of the commentatores on the 
edict. In order to ban it, the author of the constitution had to picture a type of interpretatio, 
such as that conveyed in the libri ad edictum, which started, it is true, from the 
clarification of the meaning of the verba with a word-by-word approach, but could then 
open up to clarifications on the scope of application: and these lend themselves to possibly 
create deviations from the original significance and range of the commented text, personal 
views or original solutions. For these reasons the intepretationes-‘clarifications’ of this 
kind, aliae compared to those admitted, were considered as perversiones. And for that, 
probably, in the closing words the imperial monopoly was explicitly reaffirmed, not only 
with regard to interpretare, but also with reference to condere leges: (...) ex auctoritate 
Augusta manifestetur, cui soli concessum est leges et condere et interpretari (...). 
  5.
Having reconstructed the range and the raison d'être of the ban, it is time to reflect 
specifically on the possible reasons for the presence of an antecessorial literature on the 
Digest despite the establishment of the ban, starting with a survey of the hypotheses 
advanced so far in the literature. 
 
 
                                                          
Pringsheim, ‘Justinian’s Prohibition’ (note 1 above), 400 = Abhandlungen, II, 96, that αὐτὰ 
μεταβαλεῖν alludes to διγέστα (a noun that, moreover, would have to be drawn from the too distant 
words τοῦ τῶν Digeston βιβλίου from the beginning of § 20) nor to conjecture, with V. Arangio Ruiz, 
Storia del diritto romano, Naples 19577, 399 note 1, that αὐτά is a copyist’s mistake replacing the 
original αὐτoύς. 
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Accordingly, it is appropriate to begin by reviewing Scheltema’s well-known 
reconstruction,38 who provided the most innovative and challenging analysis. 
In a study full of illuminating clarifications on the different types of instruments and 
forms of Byzantine legal interpretation and literature – from summae to κατὰ πόδας, from 
indices to παράτιτλα39 –, the Master from Groningen claimed that Justinian, contrary to 
what was traditionally considered, had not prohibited commentaries as such, but rather 
their placement directly in the manuscripts of the Corpus iuris next to the legal writing: 
due to such a placing, in fact, some copyists may have been induced to not differentiate 
between the two blocks of writing and ended up ‘confusing’ the text of the leges, in the 
sense of accidentally incorporating marginal annotations into it.40 Not, therefore, an 
‘allgemeines Auslegungsverbot’, but a prohibition of comments added in margine to the 
main-text, aimed at protecting the textual integrity and purity of the leges.41 Commentaries 
in separate works, structurally independent from the annotated text, could certainly be 
made, and this fact would well explain the existence of written products related to the 
teaching of the antecessores, which, indeed, would itself confirm this particular 
interpretation of the ban.42 
This reading, however brilliant and striking, is not without its difficulties. In this 




                                                          
38  Scheltema, ‘Das Kommentarverbot’ (note 1 above), esp. 325-331 = Opera minora, 423-428. 
39  More generally, the entire investigation has the merit of strongly calling attention to the profiles 
connected to the relationship between the main and accessory writings. It is no coincidence that also 
some scholars of the history of texts and marginalia such as Gugliemo Cavallo and Paolo Mari have 
agreed with Scheltema’s explanation of the ban (infra, note 42). 
40  Scheltema, ‘Das Kommentarverbot’ (note 1 above), 328-329 = Opera minora, 426. 
41  Scheltema, ‘Das Kommentarverbot’ (note 1 above), 329 = Opera minora, 425: ‘Es bestand also kein 
allgemeines Auslegungsverbot; man dürfte die Auslegung nur nicht in die Gesetzeshandschriften 
hineinschreiben. Das Verbot wäre demnach eine nicht unvernünftige Massnahme zur Erhaltung der 
Reinheit der Gesetzeshandschriften gewesen’. 
42  Scheltema, loc. cit. Adhering to this reconstruction are: Pieler, Rechtsliteratur, 404; Van der 
Wal/Lokin, Delineatio, 36-37; Sp. Troianos, Οι πηγές του βυζαντινού δικαίου, Αθήνα/Κομοτηνή 
20113, 102-104; G. Cavallo (/F. Magistrale), ‘Libri e scritture del diritto nell’ età di Giustiniano’, 
Index 15 (1987), 109 note 65; H. Nehlsen, ‘Der Schutz von Rechtsaufzeichnungen gegen Falscher’, 
in: Fälschungen im Mittelalter, II, (MGH – Schriften, B. 33, II), Hannover 1988, 545-576 (552); 
Wallinga, TANTA/ΔΕΔΩΚΕΝ (note 1 above), 114-118 (with additional arguments, see infra); 
Brandsma, Dorotheus (note 21 above), 279-280; P. Mari, ‘L’ armario del filologo ed i testi giuridici 
nel Codice Teodosiano’, AARC XIV (1999) (Napoli 2003), 37-143 (129-130); Kaiser, Die Epitome 
Iuliani (note 25 above), 248-249; Lokin/Van Bochove, ‘Compilazione – educazione – purificazione’ 
(note 34 above), 114-115. M. Bretone, Storia del diritto romano, Roma-Bari 1988, 400, shows 
himself inclined toward the view of Scheltema even though he observes (note 122) that this thesis 
‘non elimina ogni dubbio’. Within the same Groningen school, however, Meijering, ‘Anatolius and 







In relation to the second aspect, the difficulties seem insurmountable. The hypothesis that 
the confusio the emperor wanted to avoid consisted in the fusion of texts mistakenly 
performed by a copyist, incorporating marginal notes and official text collides, in fact, 
with an objective obstacle, consisting of the explicit statement of the purpose put forward 
by Justinian himself, which calls into question a different danger: the confusio arising as a 
result of a proliferation of conflicting opinions, a new ius controversum (supra, n. 3).43 
And this justification for the ban, as we have seen, is clearly and articulately formulated, 
even by comparison with the interpretative differences which arose between the 
commentators of the edict, and even with reference to the emperor’s interpretative 
exclusivity, arguments which have nothing to do with problems of textual tradition of the 
leges. Moreover, the words of const. Deo auct. § 12 totum ius paene conturbatum est, and 
of const. Tanta § 21 ut paene omnem Romanam sanctionem esse confusam show that 
conturbatum est and esse confusam – that are cited as being equivalent negative 
phenomena that have occurred in the past – relate to Roman law overall and not to a 
written text.44 Why, on the other hand, would Justinian have been silent on the need to 
defend the authenticity of the text, if that had been the ratio for the ban?45 Furthermore, 
 
 
                                                          
43  The fact is also indicated by Ankum, ‘La ‘codification’ de Justinien’ (note 1 above), 9 note 24 and, 
more recently, by Meijering, ‘Anatolius and the Codex’ (note 3 above), 266. 
44  Neither does the idea of a ‘physical’, so to speak, confusio between writings find a support in the 
words of const. Tanta § 21 in infinitum detraxerunt. Scheltema (‘Das Kommentarverbot’ (note 1 
above), 330 = Opera minora, 426) understands this phrase as alluding to the fact that in the libri ad 
edictum (the only source of knowledge for contemporaries of Justinian concerning the edict) not only 
there was a contiguity between clausulae edicti and jurisprudential interpretations, but these 
interpretations continually interrupted the words of the edict, so that the boundaries (fines) between 
edictal text and commentary were lost. In contrast, it may be noted first, that in the libri ad edictum 
the verba edicti were clearly marked and isolated from the comments in the usual modus citandi 
‘Praetor ait (...)’, which circumscribed the praetorian ruling; furthermore, that in the other two uses 
of infinitum and infinitas in relation to the legal production (const. Deo auctore § 1 and const. Tanta 
§ 12) the terms are used in a figurative sense; and finally, that in our § 21 the phrase in infinitum 
detrahere is directly related to the phenomenon of the accumulation of conflicting opinions, thereby 
placing itself on the same level as C. 7,47,1, on which supra, n. 3. As for the words per titulorum 
suptilitatem, understood by Scheltema as alluding to tituli written with characters small enough to be 
easily distinguished by a copist from the characters of the main text, cf. supra, note 25. 
 For his part, Ankum, ‘La ‘codification’ de Justinien’ (note 1 above), 9 note 24 remarks that the 
danger of confusion between the main text and marginalia would not really have existed since the 
annotations were written in Greek; and the observation, it would seem to me, endures, despite that 
during the sixth century we witness a phenomenon of convergence between Latin and Greek uncial 
characters (cf. N. van der Wal, ‘Die Schreibweise der dem Lateinischen entlehnten Fachworte in der 
frühbyzantinischen Juristensprache’, Scriptorium 37 (1983), 29-53; Brandsma, Dorotheus (note 21 
above), 280).  
 On the other hand, the literal translation κατὰ πόδα, being located in an interlinear position within the 
main text, had an ‘elevato potenziale corruttivo del testo’ (so Lokin/Van Bochove, ‘Compilazione – 
educazione – purificazione’ (note 34 above), 115) and, therefore, in Scheltema’s view, would have 
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the prohibition is formulated only with regard to the Digest (see above, n. 2): if the 
emperor had felt the concern of preserving the legislative texts from possible future 
confusion with notes placed in the margin, he would have established a ban also for the 
other parts of the Corpus iuris.46 
More problematic is the evaluation of the other aspect of Scheltema’s 
reconstruction, concerning the material aim of the ban. The fact is that, while with regard 
to the purpose of the ban we have available, as we have just seen, an objective and 
specially constructed indication in the three introductory constitutions, as regards the 
alternative between commentarii/ὑπομνήματα conceived (according to the traditional 
view) as structurally autonomous and self-contained works or instead as marginal notes, 
 
 
                                                          
been even more abhored. That it was, surprisingly, tolerated by Justinian as it must have appeared 
particularly useful for teaching, is widely believed and explicitly stated, recently, by F. Brandsma, 
loc. cit.; but such a justification persuades until the entire disposition is considered as addressed to the 
antecessores: but cf. infra, n. 7. 
45  The question can be formulated regarding the stance of Wallinga, TANTA/ΔΕΔΩΚΕΝ (note 1 above), 
116. This scholar noted, in support of Scheltema’s reconstruction, that § 21 is placed between two 
passages (§§ 20 and 22) that give instructions for copying, and that consequently it seems natural to 
think that the prohibition of commentaries pertains to the same type of issues. With regard to the 
specific topic, moreover, it may be noted that in reality § 20, rather than opening a unitary sequence 
up to § 22 (which would have the instructions for the copyists as its theme), concludes a series of 
steps that begins in § 17 and illustrates the relationship between the existing multitude of classical 
texts and the creation of the Digest. In particular: in § 17 Justinian emphasizes the transformation of 
the dispersive multitudo of the ancient jurisprudential production into the opulentissima brevitas of 
the Digest; in § 18 he states that, despite the wealth of compilation, inevitably cases of dispute will be 
encountered which cannot find regulation and that in such cases it will be the imperial auctoritas to 
introduce a new solution; in § 19 Justinian orders to adorare and observare the leges collected in the 
Digest and to set aside all of the most ancient texts: (...) hasce itaque leges et adorate et observate 
omnibus antiquioribus quiescentibus (...); and finally, in § 20 Justinian reports having instructed the 
insertion, at the beginning of the Digest, of an indication of the ancient books from which the 
collection is made and states that all ancient authors used for consummatio have the same dignity, 
since their texts, as a result of their inclusion in the Digest, attain the same value as the constitutions 
promulgated by him. Once the presentation of the opus made in § 20 is finished, different issues are 
addressed in §§ 21 and 22, namely the preservation and protection of the (now finished) collection 
from a variety of conflicting interpretations (§ 21) and from the obscurity and textual traps induced 
by the use of siglae (§ 22). 
46  The same Wallinga, who accepts Scheltema’s thesis, after suggesting a possible explanation for the 
limits on the Digest (‘The Digest, summarizing the works of the jurists and retaining their more 
elaborate style, was probably regarded as a potential invitation to start thinking about legal issues and 
possibly writing down some notes in the margins. Because of the similarity in style, these could then 
more easily be mistaken for parts of the text than in the case of the Code’), which, however, he 
acknowledges being ‘a somewhat unsatisfactory explanation’ (and in fact, for my part, I note that it 
seems difficult to imagine a resemblance between the elaborate style of the classical texts and that of 
annotations made by readers), concludes: ‘unless the absence of a prohibition of commentaries in 
constitutio Cordi is ever found to be the result of a faulty transmission of the text, it will always 







we can only rely on indirect indications to be drawn from certain textual data present in 
the aforementioned constitutions: and these imply a certain degree of discretion on the part 
of the interpreter and, above all, do not appear unequivocal in one way or another.  
Emblematic, first of all, is the case of the words commentarios adplicare (const. Deo 
auct. § 12) and commentarios adnectere (const. Tanta § 21), highlighted by Scheltema. 
Undoubtedly, the use of these words is striking, since they lend themselves to 
expressing the idea of concretely joining the commentarii to the official text according to 
their place in margine. And this indication would seem even more definite since – I add 
for my part – the verb adplicare is used three times in the constitution Tanta in a non-
metaphorical sense, to mean the operation of inserting classical texts into the tituli (§§ 13 
and 17) or adding books (§ 6) to compose the mosaic of the Digest.47 
On the other hand, however, even the choice itself, in a passage as important as the 
drastic prohibition of comments, of terms which do not have strict meanings is surprising 
when compared with the very different precision with which, in the same context, the 
types of writing admitted are indicated: quae παράτιτλα nuncupantur, hoc quod Graeci 
κατὰ πόδα dicunt and, in particular, adnotare, a verb that this time perfectly expresses the 
apposition of marginal writing.48 Above all, the potential probative value of these two 
verbs in favor of marginal comments is offset by the terminology given in const. Δέδωκεν, 
in which two different verbs are used for banned ὑπομνήματα and for παράτιτλα: for the 
latter, which are actually affixed in margine (‘Randscholien’),49 appears the compound 
verb προσγράφειν, while for the first the basic verb γράφειν. Is it a coincidence that the 
same author, in the space of a few, coordinated between themselves lines, is using two 
verbs which both express the idea of writing, but only one of which indicates the 
combination of one piece of writing to another? Or should we not rather think that he has 
intended in this way to juxtapose two different types of writing, one independent and one 
marginal? Such a question is all the more legitimate because the decision not to reuse the 
basic verb γράφειν occurs within the affirmation that is specifically directed to specify 
exceptions to the initial prohibition. 
Similarly, another textual element perceptively reported by Scheltema lends itself to 
a plurality of interpretations, namely the words with which, in the Greek text, the behavior 
of the transgressor of the ban is indicated: ὡς ὅ γε θαρρῶν παρὰ ταύτην ἡμῶν τὴν 
 
 
                                                          
47  As for the use of the verb adnectere in a material/topographical sense, in the absence of other 
evidence in the introductory constitutions, we may refer to the indication notitia subter adnexa which 
appears in C. 1,27,1,14; 1,27,2,17 and 18. 
48  Cf. also the use, precise and appropriate, of adscribere in const. Deo auct. § 6, relating to the notae of 
Paulus, Marcian and Ulpian to the writings of Papinianus. 
49  As in Scheltema, ‘Das Kommentarverbot’ (note 1 above), 323 = Opera minora, 420. 
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νομοθεσίαν ὑπόμνημά τι καταθέσθαι κατὰ σχῆμα τῆς ἡμετέρας κελεύσεως ἀλλοιότερον 
(...). 
The traditional translation is as follows: ‘He who dares go against this our ruling (= 
the prohibition of commentaries) composes a commentary in a form diverging from our 
disposition (...)’. Scheltema complains that the text in this way contains a repetition, and, 
noting that at the beginning of § 21 the Digest is indicated by the term νομοθεσία, 
concludes that the aforementioned repetition can be avoided if we understand the 
conjunction παρά in a locative sense: παρὰ ταύτην ἡμῶν τὴν νομοθεσίαν = ‘neben (in 
örtlicher Bedeutung) unsere Gesetzgebung’.50 To tell the truth, the repetition is not 
relevant in itself: it could be justified both as a non-rare example of bombastic phrasing of 
the two introductory constitutions to the Digest and with the aim of strongly emphasizing 
the gravity of any disobedience to the ban. Rather, what is significant and convincing is 
the use of the term νομοθεσία to indicate the Digest, as highlighted by Scheltema. In this 
direction, indeed, I would add that a full review of the uses of νομοθεσία in const. 
Δέδωκεν shows that this term is never used to refer to a single measure. The term can 
mean an overall legal regime (§ 6: twice), a structured environment such as the praetorian 
system or rules (§§ 5, 8 and 21), the overall production of the jurists (§ 12) or the entire 
Roman legal framework (τὴν (τῶν) Ῥωμαίων νομοθεσίαν: pr. and § 12); and especially, 
the term is used not only in § 11 (twice) with reference to another compilation of texts, the 
Institutiones, but even in the paragraph which immediately follows that on the 
commentarii and provides for the same punishment of falsum (against those who use 
siglae), to indicate, once again, the Digest understood as an overall written corpus. 
Moreover, when one considers that within the same § 21 νομοθεσία is used to indicate the 
praetor’s edict confused by the proliferation of divergent interpretations, it is clear that the 
author of the constitution – far from using the term in the concluding part of the paragraph 
in a very unusual manner compared to the other uses – intended to juxtapose an ancient 
νομοθεσία (the praetor’s edict) that has been damaged by the commentators and the 
νομοθεσία-Digest that must be safeguarded from such dangers.  
However – and here is the point –, the use of νομοθεσία to indicate the Digest, while 
it means rejecting the aforementioned common translation, does not necessarily imply that 
παρὰ ταύτην ἡμῶν τὴν νομοθεσίαν has topographical significance, as alluding to a writing 
placed directly ‘next’ to the text of the Digest. It would be, in fact, equally as legitimate to 
recognize an indication of cause or origin: ‘because of’ this our νομοθεσία or ‘taking the 
moves from’ this our νομοθεσία. Or again, taking into account both the overall 
‘dramatizing’ tone of the comparison with the past both of the image in const. Tanta § 21 
of a verbositas that ‘brings dishonor’ (adferre dedecus) to the Digest, one might recognize 
 
 
                                                          







in the use of παρά an idea of contrast: composing a prohibited ὑπόμνημα means to 
compose something ‘that goes against (i.e. that damages) the νομοθεσία-Digest’ since, as 
the author had said a little earlier, it would again ‘give rise to disputes, doubts and 
accumulations of texts’ (αὖθις δοῦναι στάσεώς τε καὶ ἀμφισβητήσεως καὶ πλήθους τοῖς 
νόμοις ἀφορμήν), invalidating the work of overcoming the ius controversum and the 
clarity and synthesis so emphasized in the introductory constitutions.51 
In addition to the above two cases involving textual elements already indicated by 
Scheltema, an ‘open’ solution, so to speak, is also set in relation to the use of the terms 
commentarii/ὑπομνήματα.52 
The Greek term returns, and even this time without further clarifications, in the 
following indication of the reasons for the ban, where Justinian deplores the fact that the 
praetorian edict became too large ἐκ τῆς τῶν ποικίλων ὑπομνημάτων διαφορᾶς. These 
words would seem to refer to classical libri ad edictum, instrument and vehicle of the 
loathed differences of interpretation, and then, because these words are intended to justify 
the prohibition of ὑπομνήματα expressed above, we should conclude that the term alludes, 
even in the opening phrase, to structurally autonomous commentaries. As for the Latin 
commentarii, it is natural to recognize the sense of overall and autonomous works, which 
Justinian’s compilers found in the usage of classical jurists53 and that, besides, was 
consolidated into the culture of late-Antiquity (where it could also allude, more 




                                                          
51  With this representation of a commentary ‘against’ the Digest is optimally co-ordinated the use of the 
double reference to ‘snatching from the hands and destroying’ (ἀφαρπαζομένου καὶ (...) 
διαφθειρομένου) compared with the merely ‘destroying’ (corrumpentur) of const. Tanta. The 
comparison between the two indications will return shortly, from another point of view. 
52  As rightly pointed out by Wallinga, TANTA/ΔΕΔΩΚΕΝ (note 1 above), 111 (regarding a position 
taken by Berger; but the remark may extend to the whole historiographical debate): ‘the one term that 
remains totally undefined is at the very heart of the problem: commentarius/ὑπόμνημα’. 
53  To say the truth, the evidence comes only from Gaius: cf. Gaius 2,23 and 245; 3,18; 33; 38; 54; 81; 
181; 201; 4,77; 85; 153; as well as D. 1,2,1 (Gai. 1 ad l. XII tab.). But we must admit that Gaius 
employed a terminology currently in use among his colleagues. Note, however, that the author of 
const. Imperatoriam § 6 uses commentarii not only with regard to the Institutes of Gaius, but also in 
relation to the works of other jurists. 
54  The connotation of the commentarii as works in which explanationes of things obscure written are 
programmatically interwoven with the utterance of, and the comparison between different 
interpretations of the same text is especially attested, with appropriate and clear directions, in Hier., 
in Rufin. 1,16; 3,11; in Ierem., praef.; 22, 24-27; epist. 112,5. On this point see, above all, P. Jay, 
L’éxègese de Saint Jerome d’après son “Commentaire sur Isaie”, Paris 1985, 69-80; P. Lardet, 
L’apologie de Jérôme contre Rufin: un commentaire, Paris 1993, 78 note 137a and 82 note 143a; M. 
H. Williams, The Monk and the Making of the Christian Scholarship, Chicago-London, 2006, 102-
109. It is remarkable that Jerome states that this consuetudo (regula, mos) commentariorum – the aim 
 
SG 2014 (online)





On the other hand, however, we cannot overlook that in const. Tanta and in const. 
Δέδωκεν the formulas (...) nisi tantum si velit (...) and (...) πλὴν εἰ μὴ βουληθεῖεν (...), with 
which the ban is coordinated with the activities permitted, give the impression that the 
translation κατὰ πόδα and the tituli or παράτιτλα were traced back to the figure of the 
commentarius/ὑπόμνημα. Faced with this impression there are two possibilities. Either we 
are merely to admit the existence of an objective and unsolvable ‘illogisme’55 thinking 
about an overly firm debut, led, so to speak, by a prohibitory overemphasis. Or we try to 
overcome the discrepancy, and in the latter case, once again, an alternative is looming. 
The solution proposed by Wallinga is to give to the terms of commentarii/ὑπομνήματα a 
very general significance, so as to be able to mean all sorts of notes and to refer both to an 
interlinear translation on the manuscript and to a brief summary of a main text:56 therefore, 
prohibited commentarii/ὑπομνήματα and tolerated writings would be placed, structurally 
speaking, on the same plane. But there might also be a further solution that would keep the 
configuration of the commentarii/ὑπομνήματα as autonomous works. The author of const. 
Tanta might have had directly in mind, as a unitary point of reference of the overall 
argument, the figure of interpretatio in the sense of ‘clarification’ (above, n. 4), as the next 
link tends to suggest: Alias interpretationes (...) iactare non concedimus: therefore he 
would have been induced to juxtapose various ‘clarification’ instruments and to end up 
passing over their structural peculiarities; as in the provision of const. Δέδωκεν – where 
there is no expression of the type of the alias interpretationes (...) –, we could imagine 
that the author has simply closely followed the ambiguous formula of const. Tanta.57 
 
 
                                                          
of which is that the prudens lector, cum diuersas explanationes legerit et multorum uel probanda uel 
improbanda didicerit, iudicet quid uerius sit (in Rufin. 1,16) – is observed in the interpretation of 
sacred texts as much as in the study of Latin and Greek saeculares texts (in Rufin. 3,11; epist. 
112,5,2). 
55  The expression is from Van der Wal, Les commentaires grecs (note 33 above), 51. 
56  Wallinga, TANTA/ΔΕΔΩΚΕΝ (note 1 above), 111: ‘According to the Oxford Latin Dictionary, a 
commentarius, apart from being what we call a commentary, also is ‘a notebook, private journal; an 
historical record or journal; a public record book (...); notes, jottings; a collection of notes, 
memorandum’. So it can mean all sorts of notes, and not just explanatory ones. There does not seem 
to be a good reason why ‘translation’ would not fit within the wide semantic range of the word. The 
same holds good for the Greek word ὑπόμνημα’ (with reference to LSJ). 
57  This is a possibility, however, which should be examined in the broader context of the relationships 
between the two constitutions and should be compared with the possibility that the two versions are 
instead derived from a single descriptive draft, developed independently and in parallel by two 
extensors (cf. M. Bianchini, ‘Osservazioni minime sulle costituzioni introduttive alla compilazione 
giustinianea’, in: Studi in memoria di Guido Donatuti, I, Milano 1973, 121-135 (....) = Id., Temi e 
tecniche della legislazione imperiale, Torino 2008, 100-114 (112-113); Campolunghi, Potere 
imperiale, II.2 (note 1 above), 119-121). On the issue of the relationship between the two texts cf., in 








I note, finally, one last element of reflection deduced from the passage of const. Δέδωκεν 
concerning the indication of what should be destroyed in the event of a breach of the 
prohibition. While the words of const. Tanta – volumina eorum omni modo corrumpentur 
– fit both commentaries as autonomous works and copies of the Digest into which were 
added marginalia, and are therefore irrelevant in relation to the dilemma at hand, the 
Greek text provides a clear starting point: τοῦ παρ᾿ αὐτοῦ συντεθέντος ἀφαρπαζομένου καὶ 
πᾶσιν διαφθειρομένου τρόποις (...). In this case, the subject of the destruction is directly 
and specifically the material product that has been put in place by the offender. Well, if 
evaluating the proper meaning of the verb συντίθημι and that is the idea of ‘putting 
together’, we can evaluate it in and of itself, we might think that ‘what has been put 
together’ is the combination which occurred between the main text and annotations placed 
in its margin. But if we consider this meaning of the verb in the light of the remaining 
evidence within the same const. Δέδωκεν, then we must, on the contrary, think of an 
independent work: in fact in all other uses the verb refers to the operation of or the result 
of collecting together materials in view of the formation of a volume (in a couple of these 
comparisons, indeed, the verb has the direct object βιβλίον).58 All the more reason, then, 
should we consider an autonomous volume if we were to postulate the use of συντίθημι in 
the figurative sense of ‘write’: since what is to be ‘snatched from the hand and utterly 
destroyed’ coincides with ‘that which is written’, it would not be possible to imagine, as a 
sanction, the destruction of the single note itself or all the marginal notes in themselves 
separately from the commented main text.  
In conclusion, quite differently to what happens with regard to the purpose of the 
prohibition, in relation to the material object of the prohibition the data offered by the 
introductory constitutions seem to constitute – to use words of the same Justinian – a 
circuitus inextricabilis, regard to which it appears arduous to take a clear and decisive 
interpretative line. 
And yet, for my part, weighing the arguments for and against of the various ideas 
considered thus far, and even taking into account the fact that a fear of a proliferation of 
 
 
                                                          
Orbis Iuris Romani 4 (1998), 228-240 and of G. Di Maria, ‘Tanta/Δέδωκεν. Quando la retorica 
assume forma e vigore di legge’, “Mediaeval Sophia”. Studi e ricerche sui saperi medievali, 12 
(2012/2), 116-140. 
58  In particular, the verb is used in § 1 (συντεθείκαμεν βιβλίον) to mean the collection of imperial 
constitutions in the volume-Code; in § 9 (ἅπαντα συντέθειται; cf. const. Tanta § 9: omnia confecta 
sunt) to mean the materials put together in the Digest and ordered according to the distribution in 
books described in the previous paragraphs; in § 11 (συνθεῖναι βίβλους; νομοθεσίαν συνθέντες) to 
mean the assembly of the four books of the Institutiones, in § 12 (τὸ πράγμα συντεθῆναι) to mean the 
overall work of collection achieved by the Code, Institutes and the Digest; and finally in § 19 (τῶν 
διατάξεων τῶν παρ᾿ ἡμῶν συντιθεμένων ἢ γενομένων), in which the verb distinguishes the 
constitutions collected by Justinian in the Code from those issued by himself. 
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differing opinions (the real purpose of the prohibition, as we have seen) seems more easily 
conceivable in relation to independent works rather than in relation to the annotations of 
iuris periti in the margins of their copies of the Digest (which we must imagine to have 
been destined more for personal use rather than for circulation),59 I think the traditional 
representation of a prohibition concerning the composition of autonomous and self-
standing works is, on the whole, more preferable.60 From this perspective we even find an 
adequate explanation of the use – rightly highlighted by Scheltema – of the verb applicare 
in const. Deo auct. § 12 (the same goes for adnectere in const. Tanta § 21). As you 
recall,61 in fact, in const. Deo auctore the formulation of the prohibition is immediately 
attached to the name of the work and this name alludes to the fact that the Digesta or 
Pandectae  omnes disputationes et decisiones legitimas in se habent (see const. Tanta § 
1): hence, a ban on ‘adding’, with (autonomous) commentaries, further disputes to a 
collection already considered as including all possible ‘interpretative discussions and 
resolutions of the same’. 
In essence, it seems to me that the purpose of the ban was to prevent, to use the 
expression of D. Simon, ‘ein Wiederaufleben der Kontroversenliteratur’. With that, of 
course, the problem of existence of the written production of the antecessores despite the 
ban, remains standing.62 
 
 
                                                          
59  The phrase interpretationes iactare could allude precisely to the idea (and, therefore, to the fear of) 
circulation, if account is taken of the meaning of ‘scatter’ or ‘spread’ that the verb iactare can 
express. 
60  On the other hand, I do not consider persuasive the argument put forward in support of the 
Scheltema’s hypothesis by Wallinga, TANTA/ΔΕΔΩΚΕΝ (note 1 above), 115, according to which a 
direct prohibition against autonomous comments would be superfluous, since anything from books 
other than the Institutiones, the Digesta and Codex are already prohibited from use in courts in § 19: 
‘Why would it be necessary to forbid the writing of commentaries, if they could not be quoted in 
court anyway?’. Except that – quite apart from the fact that the ‘other books’ from which citation in 
court were excluded are specifically pre-Justinian collections of constitutions and the writings of the 
classical jurists not inserted in the Digest and Institutes (in accordance with the fact that § 19 
specifically deals with the relationship between the Justinian collections and the pre-existing legal 
materials) – the fixing in writing of the positions of the iuris periti, in works intended for circulation, 
must have been seen as the formation of written material that would have indirectly influenced the 
judicial interpretation-application: and this fact went both against the idea of comprehensiveness of 
the collection and against the idea of a creative-interpretative monopoly on the part of the emperor. 
61  Cf. supra, n. 3. 








Neither, however, can the explanations that have been proposed by the traditional view, 
i.e. considering the intervention of Justinian as directed at prohibiting autonomous 
commentaries, be regarded, in my view, as decisive. 
As for the suggestion that the ban was in practice circumvented63 by the 
antecessores through the expedient of designating their works ἴνδικες and thus allowing 
them to fit one of the categories tolerated by Justinian,64 I note that the works of the 
antecessores and the short summary-notations65 mentioned in const. Deo auctore are 
clearly very different products: the simple fact of the outward and formal designation 
would not protect the authors from the charge of falsitas. 
Simpler and seemingly more persuasive, is the idea that the ban would not have 
been, in fact, violated because the antecessores confined themselves to oral teaching, 
while the written material that has reached us under their name would have come from the 
notebooks of students (not, therefore, from persons falling under the scope of the iuris 
periti), reporting faithfully what they heard in the classroom.66 However, this solution, 
which begins with a statement in itself indubitable, that is, the direct link between the 
surviving texts and teaching activities, appears nonetheless questionable in that it 
postulates that the establishment in writing of the content of the lessons is attributable 
exclusively to the transcription and to an editorial intervention, so to speak, on behalf of 
the student, without ever involving their teachers. In fact, if already by the middle of the 
last century N. van der Wal wrote that ‘il n’est pas exclu que se soient les professeurs eux-
mêmes qui aient écrit les commentaires pour leur servir de canevas de cours et qu’ils les 
 
 
                                                          
63  A revocation of the ban by Justinian, traces of which would not, in any case, have remained in the 
sources, is very difficult to imagine, taking account of the particularly strong and emphatic tone with 
which the prohibition had been put in place: thus, rightly Wallinga, TANTA/ΔΕΔΩΚΕΝ (note 1 
above), 108-109; Amelotti, ‘Giustiniano interprete’ (note 1 above), 6. 
64  Zachariä von Lingenthal, Kritische Jahrb. (note 21 above), 797; Heimbach, Prolegomena, 5; in 
recent times, in a not dissimilar order of ideas, e.g., A. Guarino, Storia del diritto romano, Napoli 
19908, 568; L. Lantella, ‘Dall’interpretatio iuris all’interpretazione della legge’, in: Nozione, 
formazione e interpretazione del diritto (note 1 above), III, 559-603 (590); Meijering, ‘Anatolius and 
the Codex’ (note 3 above), 266f. 
65  Supra, n. 4. 
66  Heimbach, Prolegomena, 7; P. Krüger, Geschichte der Quellen und Litteratur des Römischen Rechts, 
München 19122, 407; J. Sontis, Die Digestensumme des Anonymos, (Heidelb. Rechtswiss. Abh., 23), 
Heidelberg 1937, 5-6; Pringsheim, ‘Justinian’s Prohibition’ (note 1 above), 411 = Abhandlungen, II, 
103-104; L. Wenger, Die Quellen des römischen Rechts, Wien 1953 (repr. Goldbach 2000), 682; 
Simon, review of Scheltema, L’enseignement (note 62 above), 482; F. Wieacker, ‘Antecessores. 
Rechtsunterricht im Zeitalter Justinians’, in: Festschrift für H. Niederländer zum 70. Geburtstag, 
Heidelberg 1991, 215-230 (218). 
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aient retouchés en vue de leur publication. Cela semble même très probable’,67 in the 
contemporary historiography, ideas were moving more and more in the sense, at least, of 
direct participation of the antecessor. Thus, W. Kaiser put forward specific arguments in 
favor of a publication of the Epitome Iuliani by the same antecessor Julian;68 in the 
present volume, C. Russo Ruggeri makes some considerations that suggest the derivation 
of the Paraphrase of Theophilus from a text written by the teacher used as the basis for his 
lessons;69 I, too, have recently had the occasion to uncover both a concrete trace of a 
written draft of Theophilus for a course on the Institutes of Gaius (which he subsequently 
had kept in mind in the course on the imperial Institutes)70 and a specific passage in 
Stephanus’ commentary on the Digest (BS 1799/7), in which a question made by a 
student, too elaborate to have been really thought out in those terms during the lesson, 
leads one to imagine at least a work of revision by the same Stephanus of the ‘cahier de 
cours’ in view of its circulation.71 I would add here a general consideration linked to the 
 
 
                                                          
67  Van der Wal, Les commentaires grecs (note 33 above), 19. For his part, Berger‚ ‘The Emperor 
Justinian’s ban’ (note 1 above), 156, observed that it is excessive to imagine that the Byzantine 
students ‘were capable of making such good editions of the teachers’ lectures without their direct 
help’. 
68  Kaiser, Die Epitome Iuliani (note 25 above), 179-180. 
69  C. Russo Ruggeri, ‘Theophilus and the student publisher: a resolved issue?’, 99-119 
70  It is Theoph. 3,10,1, in which there is a reference to a subsequent treatment of the operarum obligatio 
(‘what this is, we shall learn by and by’) which, however, is missing in the continuation of the 
Paraphrase. In this regard we must take into account: a) the fact that in all the other 12 cases in where 
such references appear, they find their conclusion in the continuation of the treatment; b) the fact that 
the Justinian Institutes, unlike the Institutes of Gaius (Gaius 3,96), do not discuss the operarum 
obligatio; c) the fact that it is unthinkable that Theophilus had deferred a future illustration to be 
made in subsequent lectures on the Digest (book 38, in which operarum obligatio is discussed, was 
not in fact being taught; and also when Theophilus refers to a future illustration that will be made in 
his teaching on the Digest, he always mentions this different collection). In the light of all these 
circumstances, the most likely explanation is that this reference had to be present in a written version 
of the lectures on the Institutes of Gaius (the subject of teaching up to 533 AD, as is known). 
Theophilus could have still used that version as a basis for the lectures to be carried out on the new 
textbook, not realizing, however, the supervening inconclusiveness of the reference in this special 
case, caused by the lack of a subsequent treatment concerning of the operarum obligatio in the 
imperial textbook. Cf. Falcone, ‘Premessa’ (note 2 above), 156-157. 
71  Falcone, ‘Premessa’ (note 2 above), 154-156. The part of the scholion of interest here is the 
following: Εἶπας, ὅτι αὐτεξουσία γενομένη δύναται κατ᾿ οἰκείαν γνώμην ἡ κόρη γαμεῖν (...). Καίτοι 
κἂν αὐτεξουσία ἐστίν, ὀφείλει μετὰ συναινέσεως τοῦ πατρὸς γαμεῖν, ὡς ἀνήνεκται σαφῶς ἐν τῷ ε´ 
βιβ. τοῦ Κωδ. ὑπὸ τὸν δ´ τοῦ βιβ. τιτ. διατ. [ξ´] ιη´ καὶ κ´ (BS 1799/7-10). The student turns to the 
teacher during a lesson on D. 23,1,10 (concerning the sponsalia): ‘You said the girl, once 
emancipated, may marry according to her will (...). But, even if emancipated, she must marry with the 
consent of the pater, as is clearly reported (ὡς ἀνήνεκται σαφῶς) in book 5 of the Code, title 4 
constitutions 18 and 20’. Now, title 23,1 of the Digest is an object of study in the second year of the 
course (const. Omnem § 3): the learner, therefore, has not yet reached the examination of the 








fact that the teacher had to repeat the explanations of the ῥητόν every year to new groups 
of students. While, with regard to the frequent references to points previously illustrated or 
still to be illustrated and with regard to the παραγραφαί concerning individual words or 
elements of a text, one can, and maybe should, think of annotations made by the teacher in 
the margins of his own copy of the ῥητόν,72 the same is unimaginable for the complete 
translation of the ῥητόν preceded by προθεωρίαι, even using writing material with more 
ample lateral margins. This means that the teacher had to allocate to the ἴνδιξ (προθεωρίαι 
+ translations) an autonomous writing space compared to his own ῥητόν exemplar. And 
this, of course, constituted a violation of the Justinian provision, for the κατὰ πόδα 
translation was obviously already something else in content, in addition to its location 
directly between the lines of the translated ῥητόν. 
Finally, I do not think that this issue can be considered resolved by thinking that, 
although the exceptions to the Justinian prohibition were exceeded, the borders however 
would not be violated in a substantial way, from the moment that ‘gli antecessores 
bizantini, vincolati autoritativamente ai testi, non esercitano più la funzione dei classici di 
proporre nuove soluzioni, ma si attengono strettamente all’esegesi, che non può essere 
 
 
                                                          
contain allusions to the imperial constitutions: therefore, we could not think of a previous invitation, 
on behalf of the antecessor, to his students to consult specifically those constitutions (as for example 
sometimes happens in the teaching of Theophilus, in relation to a text of the Institutiones that alludes 
to an imperial disposition). 
72  In this sense already Simon, ‘Aus dem Kodexunterricht’ (note 3 above), 336. More recently it has 
been observed (K. McNamee, ‘Another chapter in the history of scholia’, CQ 48 (1998), 269-288 
(276); in adherence, G. Messeri Savorelli/R. Pintaudi, ‘I lettori dei papiri: dal commento autonomo 
agli scolii’, in: V. Fera/G. Ferraù/S. Rizzo, [ed.], Talking to the text: Marginalia from Papyri to Print, 
Messina 2002, 37-57 (55-56), that some legal papyri dating to the IV-VI centuries present such 
characteristics – particularly wide margins, marginal writing coming from the same scribes who 
edited the main text, regularity and precision in the construction of the outer and inner margins – that 
we are authorized to believe that the teachers entrusted professional scribes with putting together 
appropriate codices in order to provide students with textbooks already containing certain notes in the 
margins. This is something that, of course, would require the presence of the same annotations 
already in the copy of the ῥητόν that the teachers were using in class. The texts in question are: P. 
Berol. inv. 16976 + 16977 (R. Seider, Paläographie der Lateinischen Papyri, II,2, Stuttgart 1981, 
No. 20; E.A. Lowe, Codices Latini Antiquiores: a palaeographical guide to Latin manuscripts prior 
to the ninth century. Vol XII: Supplement, Oxford 1971 (= CLA Suppl.), No. 1783): ca. 400 A.D.; 
PSI XIII 1348: IV-V century; P. Ryl. III, 476 (CLA II (Oxford 1935), No. 225): IV-V century; P. Ant. 
III, 152 (Seider, No. 39; CLA Suppl., No. 1711): ca. 500 A.D.; P. Ant. III, 153 (Seider, No. 19; CLA 
Suppl., No. 1789): V century; MPER n.s. III, 38: V century. Of the same McNamee, cf. also ‘Missing 
links in the development of scholia’, Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 36 (1995), 399-414, and 
‘An Innovation in Annotated Codices on Papyrus’, in: B. Kramer, [ed.], Akten des 21. 
Internationalen Papyrologenkongresses, Berlin, 13.-19.8.1995, (Archiv für Papyrusforschung, 
Beiheft 3), Stuttgart 1997, 669-678. According to this scholar, it is likely that the practice of using 
codices with large margin to allow the addition of annotations arose in relation to the teaching of law 
at Beryth. 
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neppure critica, ma solo diretta all’armonizzazione’.73 Indeed, we can note, first, that the 
reconstruction of the same content-related traits of teaching hitherto made, is essentially 
based on texts related to the courses offered by Thalelaeus on the Code (from which, 
notoriously, we learn the positions of the ἥρωες of the fifth century), while with regard to 
the eastern teaching on the jurisprudential material – which, as we have said, lent itself to 
rousing a problematizing and controversial attitude from the interpreters (above, n. 3) – we 
have only the testimony of the Scholia Sinaitica, too poor to tell us something about the 
normal type of approach and content of teaching arising from the texts of the classical 
jurists. Moreover, with reference to the post-ban production, it may be noted, on the one 
hand, that the texts arising from the teaching of Stephanus on the Digesta leave not 
infrequent pointers to divergent interpretations of various teachers on certain elements of 
the ῥητόν,74 which are not fully in line with the strongly negative depiction of the 
existence of contrariae interpretantium sententiae referred to by const. Deo auctore and, 
in the substance, const. Tanta / Δέδωκεν § 21; on the other hand, the gaps are too large in 
our knowledge of the production attributable to other antecessores to use the contents of 
the documentation to come to a criterion for assessment of the compatibility or otherwise 
between the existence of the ban and the presence of the writings related to antecessores: 
just think of the circumstance, particularly eloquent and instructive, that from Cobidas – 
an antecessor so prestigious that Stephanus (presumably, his contemporary) gave him the 
qualification ὁ σοφώτατος ἀντικήνσωρ and that the author of a gloss to the Paraphrase of 
Theophilus, dating from the second half of the sixth century, transposes the Sabiniani and 
Proculiani into current terms by referencing κοβιδιανοί and θυλακιανοί75 – there are only 
very few surviving textual residues.76 
 
 
                                                          
73  As in Amelotti, ‘Giustiniano interprete’ (note 1 above), 8-9, who, with regard to the overall 
connotation of the approach and contents of the work of the antecessores, relies on the conclusions of 
D. Simon, ‘Aus dem Kodexunterricht des Thalelaios. B. Die Heroen’, SZ 87 (1970), 315-394 (389-
394); on this connotation, cf. also F. Wieacker, ‘Πόνοι τῶν διδασκάλων. Leistung und Grenzen der 
frühen oströmischen Rechtswissenschaft‘, in: Beiträge zur europäischen Rechtsgeschichte und zum 
geltenden Zivilrecht: Festgabe für Johannes Sontis, München 1977, 53-89 (67-71); Id., Römische 
Rechts-geschichte, II (note 19 above), 272-279. 
74  Cf., e.g., BS 1086/27; 1419/18; 1421/12; 1427/3; 1449/15; 1450/21; 1458/18; 1485/27; 1512/9; 
1555/31; 1558/28; 1562/18; 1574/1; 2127/29. 
75  It concerns a gloss pertaining to Theoph. 2,1,25, ed. C. Ferrini, ‘Scolii inediti allo Pseudo-Teofilo 
contenuti nel manoscritto Gr. Par. 1364’, Memorie del Reale Istituto Lombardo, 3a Serie 9, Milano 
1886, 13-68 (non vidi) (= Opere di Contardo Ferrini, I, Milano 1929, 139-224 (172)); as for the 
θυλακιανοί, the term alludes, perhaps, to an antecessor  Θυλακᾶς, mentioned in Peira 16,9. Cf., most 
recently, Falcone, ‘Premessa’ (note 2 above), 152; R. Meijering, ‘Traces of Byzantine Legal 
Literature in Theophilus Scholia’, in the present volume, 383-398. 
76  The fragments are collected in Heimbach, Prolegomena, 60-61; on the figure of Cobidas, see H.J. 








At this point, it would probably be advisable to stop and opt for the ars nesciendi, just as 
Scheltema did himself at an early stage of his scientific path, in 1970, with the volume 
L’enseignement du droit des antecesseurs.77 And yet, precisely because of the very 
existence of a plurality of views that make up the historiographical landscape, I believe it 
is not too far-fetched to propose a hypothesis that has been emerging over the course of 
this current enquiry. 
It revolves around a question concerning the datum that has formed the very basis of 
the entire historiographical debate: I wonder if – despite the recurring identification of the 
recipients of the prohibition with the law professors – Justinian, in speaking of iuris periti 
(in const. Deo auct. § 12), of ‘those who have iuris peritia’ (in const. Tanta § 21), of 
‘those who currently are and who will be in the future’ (in const. Δέδωκεν), was thinking 
in reality of the antecessores. 
It is hardly necessary to observe preliminarily that, even wishing to give priority to 
the most well-defined of the three appellations used in the introductory constitutions, 
namely iuris periti, we are faced with a wide definition, which in itself does not match 
with ‘teachers’. That in const. Tanta § 9, the antecessor Theophilus is qualified, together 
with other epithets (vir illustris, magister) as iuris peritus, does not imply a connection 
between this qualification and his role as a teacher: rather, a reference to this role is 
expressed by the subsequent words in hac splendidissima civitate (...) optimam legum 
gubernationem extendentem (see, immediately after, with regard to Dorotheus: in 
Berytiensium splendisissima civitate leges discipulis tradentem). On the other hand, 
Justinian includes in his Code a constitution of Leo from 460 AD, which provides for the 
existence of a sworn statement with which teachers must certify that the advocati who 
wish to defend in the Illyricum prefecture have earned a iuris peritia: Iuris peritos etiam 
doctores eorum iubemus iuratos...depromere, esse eum, qui posthac subrogari voluerit, 
peritia iuris instructum (C. 2,7,11,2). This wording shows the use of iuris periti to indicate 
the figure of lawyers or legal experts, and a different and separate designation, doctores, to 
specify their role as teachers. And in the same Code we find the iuris periti qualification in 
reference to the (classical) jurists not only in previous emperors’ constitutions (C. 6,61,5,1 




                                                          
77  Cf. p. 17 = Opera minora, 70. 
78  To the figure of iurisperitus as a jurist who provides responsa alludes, in the late epoch, Aug., Epist. 
153,23 vendidit advocatus iustum patrocinium et iurisperitus iustum consilium; Aug., Conf. 8,6,13 
mecum erat Alypius otiosus ab opere iuris peritorum post adsessionem tertiam, expectans quibus 
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The prohibition, therefore, is textually addressed to ‘jurists’, ‘legal experts’ and not 
specifically to ‘teachers’.79 This does not, of course, mean that the ban may not have been 
understood as being also addressed to professors, who obviously fall into the category of 
iuris periti;80 rather, it simply shows that the mention of iuris periti in itself does not 
necessarily lead us to think of the prohibition as directed specifically at teachers. It is still 
to be seen whether there is more than mere terminological evidence, which can provide 
more precise insights. 
Now, an objective fact is the absence of the prohibition in const. Omnem, addressed 
directly to the antecessores. At first glance, we might consider this absence insignificant: 
that is, we may imagine that it was seen as unnecessary to repeat the prohibition 
specifically for the antecessores, because they were already included among the subjects 
mentioned in const. Deo auctore and const. Tanta. However, this reasoning is difficult to 
sustain in the face of the fact that Justinian did not hesitate to repeat another prohibition in 
const. Omnem (also present in Deo auctore and in Tanta/Δέδωκεν), that of using the 
siglae. Furthermore, at the same date of the const. Omnem, const. Tanta rephrased the 
sanction concerning the commentaries with greater care than in const. Deo auctore § 12: 
the translation of the κατὰ πόδα was added to the permissible activities, the comparison 
with the past was defined with reference to the praetorian edict and the form of the 
violation of the ban as a case of falsum and the indicated penalties were added. Faced with 
 
 
                                                          
iterum consilia venderet; and above all Nov. Th. 1,1 (...) ne iurisperitorum ulterius (...) velut ab ipsis 
adytis expectarentur formidanda responsa (...). 
79  The following scholars speak opportunely of ‘giuristi’: R. Bonini, Ricerche di diritto giustinianeo, 
Milano 1968, 235 note 5; Bianchini, ‘Osservazioni minime’ (note 57 above), 131 = Temi e tecniche, 
110; Campolunghi, Potere imperiale (note 1 above), II.1, 235-269 (and in particular 264 note 151). 
G. Bassanelli Sommariva, L’imperatore unico creatore ed interprete delle leggi e l’autonomia del 
giudice nel diritto giustinianeo, Milano 1983, 12 note 7 and Martini, ‘Sul monopolio interpretativo’ 
(note 35 above), 529, speak of ‘giuristi e avvocati’. These indications, however, were assumed 
without special argument. Recently, L. Russo Ruggeri, ‘Gaio, la parafrasi e le ‘tre anime’ di Teofilo’, 
SDHI LXXVIII (2012), 197-220 (esp. 204), distinguishes, in relation to Theophilus, between teacher, 
iuris peritus and compiler. On the figures that, in the Justinian age, may ascribed to the qualification 
of jurists, cf. the efficacious recent contribution of F. Goria, ‘Il giurista nell’impero romano d’Oriente 
(fra Giustiniano agli inizi del secolo XI)’, FM XI (2005), 147-211 (154-189). 
80  See, if needed, Pragm. sanctio pro pet. Vigilii c. 22, in which iurisperiti refers to teachers of law; or 
C. 12,15,1 in which, under the rubric De professoribus qui in urbe constantinopolitana docentes ex 
lege meruerint comitivam, the following is disposed: Grammaticos tam graecos quam latinos, 
sophistas et iuris peritos in hac regia urbe professionem suam exercentes et inter statutos 
connumeratos, si laudabilem in se probis moribus vitam esse monstraverint, si docendi peritiam 
facundiamque dicendi interpretandi subtilitatem copiam disserendi se habere patefecerint, et coetu 
amplissimo iudicante digni fuerint aestimati, cum ad viginti annos observatione iugi ac sedulo 
docendi labore pervenerint, placuit honorari et his qui sunt ex vicaria dignitate connumerari (cf. 







greater attention to the prohibition, it seems even more necessary to assume that this ‘non-
mention’ in const. Omnem has a precise meaning.81 
Why not look to the most natural and immediate emerging explanation: that in 
formulating the prohibition, Justinian did not have professors in mind as its recipients? 
It is however not only this absence in const. Omnem that points towards this 
possibility.82 First of all this absence coordinates, in fact, with another circumstance 
usually pushed into the background, and this is that the wording of the ban is linked to an 
overall consideration of the Digest as a collection intended for practical, forensic-judicial 
use. 
This fact is particularly evident in the constitutions Tanta and Δέδωκεν. In fact, if up 
to § 16 the whole discourse had been set on construction of the work,83 starting from § 17 
the prospect of its use in courts is constantly referred to. In particular: § 17 states that in 
the past those who conducted trials had, in practice, the opportunity to use a limited 
number of legal texts, with the result that ‘most disputes were settled according to the will 
of the judges rather than according to the authority of the law’ (const. Tanta: voluntate 
iudicum magis quam legitima auctoritate lites dirimebantur); § 18 promises the possibility 
 
 
                                                          
81  Consistent with their adherence to Scheltema’s reconstruction, some scholars have pointed out that 
the same lack of prohibition in const. Omnem coordinates with the fact that the prohibition concerned 
only comments affixed in margine: cf. Van der Wal/Lokin, Delineatio, 36; Lokin/Van Bochove, 
‘Compilazione – educazione – purificazione’ (note 34 above), 114; in a veiled manner, Wallinga, 
TANTA/ΔΕΔΩΚΕΝ (note 1 above), 108. However, even regardless of whether or not we accept the 
overall interpretative model (supra, n. 5), this remark can not be reconciled with the fact that, in all 
likelihood , even the teachers were accustomed to affix, for their teaching work, marginal annotations 
in the manuscripts of the leges: supra, n. 6. 
82  That the lack of prohibition in const. Omnem can be understood as evidence to argue that the ban was 
not addressed to the antecessores has been recently supported by Wieacker, Römische 
Rechtsgeschichte, II (note 19 above), 300. This scholar drew arguments from this absence in favour 
of one of the two possibilities that he himself proposes to explain the existence of the antecessorial 
literature: ‘Entweder das Verbot betraf überhaupt nicht die Rechtslehrer (an der drei noch 
autorisierten Rechtsschulen von Beryt, Konstantinopel und Rom) und ihre Lehrvorträge mit 
Einschluss ihrer Nieder- und Nachschriften; dafür spricht, daß gerade die an sie gerichtete c. Omnem 
das Verbot mit keinem Wort erwähnt, und vor allem, daß das vom Kaiser begünstigte und 
reorganisierte Curriculum ohne Paraphrasen, Exemplifikationen und gegebenenfalls Protheorien 
schlechtin unvorstellbar war, die sich auf keine Weise unter die (allenfalls) erlaubten κατὰ πόδα oder 
παράτιτλα einzwängen liessen (...). Oder aber das Verbot betraf von vorneherein nur den Gebrauch 
veröffentlichter und literarisch verbreiteter Erläuterungen (irgend eines iuris peritiam habens) vor 
Gericht: dafür spricht, daß es sich nach seinem ganzen Konzept gegen erneute Verwirrung der 
praktischen Rechtsanwendung durch neue Subtilitäten und Kontorversen richtet. Das Verbot könnte 
dann allenfalls solche Unterrichtskommentare betroffen haben, die literarische Verbreitung gefunden 
hatten und dann mit dem Gesetzestext (§ 21: adnecti) vor Gericht zitiert wurden’. 
83  Premises of the compilation: pr. and § 1; method of completion of the Digest and Institutes: §§ 2-12; 
internal characteristics of the collection: §§ 13-16. 
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that in the future a dispute84 cannot find regulation in the Digest and that, as had been 
established at that time in relation to the praetorian edict, the emperor would provide an 
appropriate solution; § 19 states that only texts from the three Justinian collections may be 
used in trials; § 22 states that it will not be allowed in court to quote a text from a copy of 
the Digest containing siglae (const. Tanta: neque ex licentiam aperimus tali codice in 
iudicium aliquid recitare); § 23 states that the leges contained in the three collections are 
in force in iudiciis both for future cases and for those pending; finally in § 24, magistrates 
are ordered to ensure compliance with the texts collected by Justinian both in the courts of 
their own jurisdiction and in the regia urbe. Well, not only is § 21 inserted into this 
sequence, but it itself contains, as we have seen,85 the reference to the hypothesis that 
some matter appears dubious to the parties or the judge and therefore makes a clarifying 
intervention of the emperor necessary. Moreover, this reference is accompanied by the 
following justification: to the emperor alone it was granted to create and interpret the laws 
(cui soli concessum est leges et condere et interpretari). Such a claim establishes a 
correlation-contrast (most evident in const. Δέδωκεν because of the conjunction γάρ) 
between this monolithic exclusivity of the imperial clarification for the application of 
leges in the courts and the ‘divergence of various commentaries’ (διαφορά τῶν ποικίλων 
ὑπομνημάτων), a divergence which, therefore, even more seems to be a phenomenon 
conceived in a forensic-judicial perspective. 
As for const. Deo auctore, whose indications are more frugal because of an overall 
greater concision of content, immediately before the formulation of the ban there is a 
reference to the frequentissimus ordo iudiciorum as a criterion in selecting the material to 
be included in the collection (§ 10) and a lapidary hint at the use in the courts (§ 11: 
Ideoque iubemus duobus istis codicibus omnia gubernari) which corresponds to the more 
structured and explicit discourse of const. Tanta/Δέδωκεν § 19. 
Well, if we put together the fact that the ban is not contained in the constitution 
specifically addressed to professores legum and the fact that the provision of prohibited 
and permitted activities for the iuris periti and for ‘those who have or will have iuris 
peritia’ is framed in an overall consideration of the practical use of the Digest, it seems 
that we are entitled to assume that the prohibited commentarii/ὑπομνήματα are understood 
by Justinian as referring to the Digest not as an object of teaching, but as a legal text to be 
used in courts and, consequently, that the recipients of the prohibition were not professors. 
 
 
                                                          
84  The reference to the dispute is explicit in the Greek text: Εἰ δὲ καί τι τὸ λοιπὸν ἀμφισβητηθείη (...), 
ζητήσεσιν, διαιρεῖν καὶ θεραπεύειν; as for negotia quae non sunt legum laqueis innodata of const. 
Tanta, it is enough to point to, among others, the following Justinian texts where negotium is used in 
the sense of a law-suit or trial: C. 1,2,21,2; 1,29,3; 1,53,1,4; 3,10,3; 4,1,1,.2; 4,1,12,2; 4,21,18; 
4,21,21,4; 4,30,15; 7,17,1pr.; 7,45,14; 7,62,37pr.-1; 11,48,20,5. 







Moreover, we know that Justinian, advocating a high view of legal teaching as an 
instrument for an appropriate training for future iustitiae et rei publicae ministri,86 counted 
on the commitment of the antecessores to leges clare et dilucide tradere (const. Omnem § 
2) and even expected that they applied an interpretandi subtilitas during their lessons (C. 
12,15,1).87 Therefore, on closer inspection, it would be surprising that he abhorred the idea 
that the concrete content of such teaching, transmitted orally in class, was fixed in a 
written text: even adding (at the same time as the publication of const. Omnem) the very 
serious poena falsitatis into the constitutions Tanta and Δέδωκεν. 
In essence, I believe that Justinian, according to the perspective from which he 
looked at the Digest, forbade commentaries as tools and vehicles of interpretatio having 
as its object the collection as legislation to be applied in the courts. The teaching activities 
of the antecessores and the written products derived from it were unaffected by his 
provision, hence the non-repetition of the same in const. Omnem. 
In terms of admissibility, then, what has been observed so far draws support from 
the fact that the types of writing directly related to the commentaries, namely the indices-
tituli-παράτιτλα and translation of the κατὰ πόδα, were to be used, as is natural, by any 
iurisperitus, not only by the teachers. In effect, the addition in margine to copies of legal 
texts of brief references to the contents was an effective consultation tool. It aided the 
swift recovery of a particular legal provision in view of any need, be it for teaching, 
personal study, consultancy, pleading and judicial interventions.88 As for the translation of 
Latin texts, its usefulness for the needs of practical application, and trials in the first place, 
is attested, if such were needed, since the same complete translation of the Digest was 
 
 
                                                          
86  On this point, I refer to Falcone, ‘Premessa’ (note 2 above), 150-153. 
87  The text is quoted supra, note 80. I take this opportunity to report that in ‘Premessa’ (note 2 above), 
153, through an oversight, I indicated the inclusion of law professors as an innovation in comparison 
with the disposition of Theodosius: cf. in fact CTh. 6,21,1. 
88  Moreover, the surviving summae – which may be considered more extensive versions of indices-
tituli-παράτιτλα (as Van der Wal/Lokin, Delineatio, 47; Lokin/Van Bochove, ‘Compilazione – 
educazione – purificazione’ (note 34 above), 128) – come or not from jurists (Cyrillus and Anatolius) 
who were contemporary teachers (Scheltema, ‘Das Kommentarverbot’ (note 1 above), 311 = Opera 
minora, 406, considers that neither one nor the other were antecessores; otherwise, for an 
identification of Anatolius with the antecessor mentioned in const. Tanta/Δέδωκεν, cf. J.H.A. Lokin, 
‘Anatolius antecessor’, in: Id., Analecta Groningana ad ius graeco-romanum pertinentia, (ed. Th.E. 
van Bochove), Groningen 2010, 81-87; Lokin/Meijering, Anatolius and the Excerpta Vaticana (note 
3 above), 24-30), directly testify that the operation of synthesis of the official legal text was also 
necessary for the practical use of the collections: on this point see Scheltema, ‘Das 
Kommentarverbot’ (note 1 above), 309-311 = Opera minora, 405-407; Lokin/Meijering, Anatolius 
and the Excerpta Vaticana (note 3 above), 27-28. 
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soon accomplished by Dorotheus, which, as is well known and self-evident, was not 
created for the needs of teaching.89 
And furthermore, the absence of the prohibition in const. Omnem perfectly 
coordinates both with the goal of the prohibition, that is, the intention of preventing the 
recurrence and spread of a plurality of conflicting interpretations, and the words with 
which this goal has been enshrined by Justinian. Referring to what has been noted above 
(n. 3-4), I point out here that the overall comparison with the negative example of the past 
in const. Tanta/Δέδωκεν § 21 establishes a direct correlation, I would say a 
correspondence between the commentatores of the edict, as carriers of divergent 
interpretations, and ‘those who have or will have iuris peritia’, to whom it is forbidden to 
give rise to a new discordia. Such a correlation-correspondence leads us to believe that, 
like the ancient commentatores, the subjects of the ban were, not professors who teach 
educational material, but jurists who interpret and comment on legal texts. In other words, 
what Justinian would prohibit was interpretive work similar to that conducted by classical 
jurists,90 which lent itself to being solicited both from the internal structure of the collected 
material (supra, n. 3) and, ultimately, the same enhancement of the ancient jurisprudential 
production accomplished with the compiling:91 an interpretative work which would not 
only reopen a ius controversum, fracturing the certainty of the law, but also – for its risk of 
expansion, innovation, deviation from the texts – undermine the exclusivity of the 
imperial nomopoietic and interpretative power (which for this reason is strongly 
emphasized in const. Tanta/Δέδωκεν, together with the direct attribution of ancient texts 
to the imperial auctoritas).92 
 
 
                                                          
89  Above all, Brandsma, Dorotheus (note 21 above), 70. The same author (p. 280), based on the trace 
offered by PSI 1350 (Ar. l. 8), suggests that the translation was originally located at the margins of the 
manuscript, tracing back to the typology of the παράτιτλα. 
90  In similar order of ideas, see Amelotti, ‘Giustiniano interprete’ (note 1 above), 8, albeit in a different 
overall framework (supra, on note 73). This scholar, moreover, considers the provisions of the 
constitutions in const. Deo auctore § 12 and const. Tanta/Δέδωκεν § 21 as directed ‘to the school’. 
91  On the fear that ‘l’esaltazione del prestigio della grande giurisprudenza classica’, made with the same 
compiling collection, ‘avrebbe potuto indirettamente legittimare una analoga attività interpretativa da 
parte dei contemporanei operatori del diritto’ I refer to G. Falcone, ‘Giustiniano, i giuristi classici e i 
professori di diritto’, in: P. De Lucia/F. Mercogliano, [ed.], Lezioni Emilio Betti (Camerino 2001-
2005), Napoli 2006, 73-100 (83-87) (where, however, I followed the widespread identification 
between the iuris periti mentioned in the ban and the antecessores). 
92  Cf. const. Tanta §§ 10 and 20 (already before const. Deo auctore §§ 6 and 7), for which, see again 
Falcone, ‘Giustiniano’ (note 91 above), 84-85. In particular, it is significant that the reference to 
legum veritas of const. Tanta § 10, which anticipates the mention of legitima veritas in § 12 – 
alluding to the result obtained (also) via the elimination of the ancient jurisprudential disputes by 
Justinian (supra, n. 3) –, is inserted in a context in which the imposition of imperial auctoritas over 
the ancient jurisprudential material is highlighted; cf., recently, Falcone, ‘La veritas delle leges’ (note 







In conclusion, if the hypothesis here proposed is reliable, then the whole problem of the 
existence of both the prohibition on commentaries and the ‘antecessorial literature’ (not 
just on the Digest) would be resolved. The scene of prohibited interpretatio was not the 
teaching activities, nor were the antecessores the subjects of the prohibition of 
commentaries. Between the creation and development of this literature and the prohibition 
of commentaries there would no longer be any tension. The written production coming 
from (more or less directly) the professors of law would not have been created – very 
strangely indeed – in defiance of the will of the creator of the Digest. 
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